©2023 Seyfarth Shaw LLP www.seyfarth.com 2023 Cal-Peculiarities | 141 205 Id. at 340 & n. 11 (handbook disclaimer language is not controlling, but may be considered as evidence of at-will employment: “the more clear, prominent, complete, consistent, and all-encompassing the disclaimer language,” the greater the likelihood that the parties intended the employment to be at will). 206 Nelson v. United Techs., 74 Cal. App. 4th 597, 615 (1999) (affirming finding of implied contract notwithstanding at-will language in job application that by its terms was not “intended in any way to create an employment contract”). See generally Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child & Family Servs., 207 Cal. App. 4th 1511, 1522 (2012) (declining to enforce arbitration clause contained within a handbook that stated, “This Handbook is not intended to create a contract of employment …”). 207 Scott v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 11 Cal. 4th 454, 473-74 (1995). 208 Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 345-46 (2000) (triable issue exists that dismissed employees could rely on RIF guidelines as part of implied contract, even though guidelines not distributed to employees generally). 209 CACI 2404—Breach of Employment Contract—Unspecified Term—”Good Cause” Defined. 210 Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall, 17 Cal. 4th 93, 107-09 (1998). 211 Silva v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 4th 256, 275 (1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer on claim for breach of an implied contract to terminate only for good cause: “While the investigation was not perfect, it was appropriate given that it was conducted ‘under the exigencies of the workaday world and without benefit of the slow-moving machinery of a contested trial”). 212 Serri v. Santa Clara Univ., 226 Cal. App. 4th 830, 873-74 (2014) (affirming summary judgment for employer on breach of implied contract claim, and rejecting plaintiff’s claim that a jury should decide whether her misconduct was serious enough to warrant immediate termination under the Cotran good cause standard). 213 Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 353 n.18 (2000) (“[T]he covenant prevents a party from acting in bad faith to frustrate the contract’s actual benefits. Thus, for example, the covenant might be violated if termination of an at-will employee was a mere pretext to cheat the worker out of another contract benefit to which the employee was clearly entitled, such as compensation already earned”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 214 See, e.g., Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264, 1272-73 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1990) (breach of implied covenant may occur where employer made an offer of employment of at-will employment, without stating that the offer was contingent on a credit check, and then, relying on the outcome of that check, revoked the offer before the new hire started work); Sheppard v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 61, 67 (1990) (reversing summary judgment against contractual wrongful termination claim of individual who, in reliance on job offer, moved from California to Tennessee to take the job, only to be denied employment after he made pre-employment visit to office dressed in jeans and T-shirt; claim sustainable notwithstanding at-will employment status, as doctrine of promissory estoppel gave plaintiff right to assume he would have chance to perform job to the good-faith satisfaction of his employer). 215 Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Corp., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 352-53 (2000) (summary judgment affirmed as to implied covenant claim: “To the extent Guz’s implied covenant cause of action seeks to impose limits on Bechtel’s termination rights beyond those to which the parties actually agreed, the claim is invalid. To the extent the implied covenant claim seeks simply to invoke terms to which the parties did agree, it is superfluous”). 216 See, e.g., M.F. v. Pac. Pearl Hotel Mgmt., LLC, 16 Cal. App. 5th 693, 700 (2017) (workers’ compensation act did not preempt FEHA claim by hotel housekeeper that hotel was liable for negligently failing to prevent her rape by a drunken trespasser whose dangerous presence should have been known to hotel management; “workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine is inapplicable to claims under the FEHA”). 217 See, e.g., Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 68 Cal. App. 4th 101, 112-13 (1998) (emotional distress claim based on violation of fundamental public policy not preempted by WCA); Leibert v. Transworld Sys., 32 Cal. App. 4th 1693 (1995) (emotional distress claim based on same conduct as public policy claim lies outside exclusive remedy provision); Accardi v. Superior Court (City of Simi Valley), 17 Cal. App. 4th 341, 353 (1993) (WCA does not bar claim for infliction of emotional distress based on conduct that violates public policy). 218 Id. 219 See, e.g., Miklosy v. Regents of Univ. of California, 44 Cal. 4th 876, 902-03 (2008) (WCA preempts emotional distress claims arising from “risks inherent” in the normal employment relationship; “whistle blower retaliation” is risk inherent in normal employment relationship); Ferretti v. Pfizer, Inc., 2012 WL 3638541, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2012) (wrongful termination plaintiff cannot use Cabesuela to support claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, in view of Miklosy); Yau v. Margarita Ford, Inc., 229 Cal. App. 4th 144, 161-62 (2014) (upholding dismissal of IIED claim brought against individual defendant who allegedly gave illegal directions regarding fraudulent warranty claims; after Miklosy, violation of public policy does not support exception to WCA exclusivity); Vasquez v. Franklin Mgmt. Real Estate Fund, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 4th 819, 832-33 (2013) (Cabesuela and Leibert have been limited); Singh v. Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc., 186 Cal. App. 4th 338, 366–67 (2010) (WCA exclusivity barred claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where employer “berated and humiliated [plaintiff], criticized his job performance, and insulted him with profanities on a regular basis”; “employer’s intentional misconduct in connection with actions that are a normal part of the employment relationship … resulting in emotional injury is considered to be encompassed within the compensation bargain, even if the misconduct could be characterized as ‘manifestly unfair, outrageous, harassment, or intended to cause emotional disturbance.’”‘). 220 See Light v. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 14 Cal. App. 5th 75, 101 (2017) (“[W]e are unwilling to abandon the long-standing view that unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of FEHA falls outside the compensation bargain and therefore claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress based on such discrimination and retaliation are not subject to workers’ compensation exclusivity.”). 221 Id. at 81. 222 Id. at 101. 223 Id. at 82-85. 224 Lab. Code section 4558(b) provides: “An employee, or his or her dependents in the event of the employee’s death, may bring an action at law for damages against the employer where the employee’s injury or death is proximately caused by the employer’s knowing removal of, or knowing failure to install, a point of operation guard on a power press, and this removal or failure to install is specifically authorized by the employer under conditions known by the employer to create a probability of serious injury or death.”
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