142 | 2023 Cal-Peculiarities ©2023 Seyfarth Shaw LLP www.seyfarth.com 225 Santos v. Crenshaw Mfg., Inc., 55 Cal. App. 5th 39 (2020). 226 Id. at 42. 227 Id. at 46. 228 Id. at 54-56. 229 Reynaud v. Technicolor Creative Servs. USA, Inc., 46 Cal. App. 5th 1007 (2020). 230 Id. at 1011-14. 231 Id. at 1014. 232 Id. at 1021-23. 233 Id. 234 Id. at 1023. 235 See e.g., Stevenson v. Superior Court (Huntington Mem’l Hosp.), 16 Cal. 4th 880, 885 (1997) (FEHA does not preempt any common law tort claims, so that employee may bring claim for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy against age discrimination even though FEHA already provides a statutory remedy for age discrimination); see also Nelson v. United Techs., 74 Cal. App. 4th 597, 611-12 (1999) (fired employee may sue for wrongful termination in violation of public policy expressed in California Family Rights Act, even though CFRA itself provides remedies for violations); Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc., 242 Cal. App. 4th 1367, 1383 (2015) (employee may assert public-policy tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy aginst disability discrimination, without meeting FEHA’s one-year statute of limitations). 236 Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a)(2). 237 Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 4th 243 (2009). 238 Id. at 248. 239 Id. 240 Id. at 286 (citing law review article authored by Chief Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit). 241 Davis v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 220 Cal. App. 4th 358, 361 (2013). 242 Id. 243 Id. at 369 (emphasis in original). 244 Id. at 370. 245 Gov’t Code § 12923(e). 246 See, e.g., Coate v. Superior Court (State of California), 81 Cal. App. 3d 113, 115 (1978) (absent a finding of waiver of the privilege, a court may not compel disclosure of joint federal or joint state income tax returns, or information contained therein; privilege of tax returns “facilitate[s] tax enforcement by encouraging a taxpayer to make full and truthful declarations in his return, without fear that his statements will be revealed or used against him for other purposes”). 247 See, e.g., Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257-58 (1980) (statute of limitations for Title VII action began to run when adverse employment decision was communicated to employee, not when it took effect). But see Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (180-day statute of limitations for filing equal-pay suit reset with each new discriminatory paycheck). 248 Id. 249 Romano v. Rockwell Int’l, 14 Cal. 4th 479, 503 (1996). Similarly, under Ninth Circuit authority that would likely apply to a California claim, a plaintiff suing for constructive discharge can start the time in which to sue with the date of resignation, not the day of the last event prompting the resignation. Fielder v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973, 988 (9th Cir. 2000) (date of resignation, not date of last intolerable act, triggers limitations period for constructive discharge claim), judgment vacated by UAL Corp. v. Fielder, 536 U.S. 919 (2002). 250 McCaskey v. CSAA, 189 Cal. App. 4th 947, 957-62 (2010) (2020), judgment reversed and remanded by Pollock v. Tri-Modal Dist. Servs., 11 Cal. 5th 918 (2021). 251 Pollock v. Tri-Modal Dist. Servs., 11 Cal. 5th 918 (2021). 252 Id. at 941. 253 Id. at 945-47. 254 Id. 255 Richards v. CHWM Hill, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 798, 802 (2001). 256 Id. For more on California’s continuing violation doctrine, see § 6.11.3. 257 Brome v. California Highway Patrol, 44 Cal. App. 5th 786, 798-801 (2020). 258 Id. 259 Blue Fountain Pools & Spas Inc. v. Superior Court (Arias), 53 Cal. App. 5th 239 (2020). 260 Id. at 245-46. 261 Id. at 252. 262 McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. 4th 88, 102 (2008).
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