©2023 Seyfarth Shaw LLP www.seyfarth.com 2023 Cal-Peculiarities | 143 263 Brome v. California Highway Patrol, 44 Cal. App. 5th 786, 795-98 (2020). 264 Id. 265 Id. at 798. 266 See, e.g., Ellis v. U.S. Security Assocs., 224 Cal. App. 4th 1213 (2014) (reversing judgment for the defendant, where plaintiff, a security guard, had signed an employment application purporting to limit the statute of limitations to six months for any employment-related claim). 267 Id. at 1217. 268 Hildebrandt v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, 58 Cal. App. 5th 128, 136-39 (2020) (citing American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), and Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103 (1988)). 269 Hildebrandt, 58 Cal. App. 5th at 139-45. 270 Id. 271 See, e.g., Civ. Code § 1624(a). 272 Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 673 (1988) (citing White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 Cal. 2d 336, 343-44 (1968)). 273 See Civ. Code § 1624(a)(1): “The following contracts are invalid unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent: (1) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof.” 274 See, e.g., Sciborski v. Pac. Bell Directory, 205 Cal. App. 4th 1152 (2012) (to invoke LMRA preemption, defendant must show claim “cannot be resolved on the merits without choosing among competing interpretations of a collective bargaining agreement and its application to the claim”; CBA interpretation not needed to resolve claim that employer unlawfully used self-help to deduct funds from wages already paid, upon the employer’s unilateral declaration that a commission was unearned) 275 Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1054 1071 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting LMRA preemption argument because, although claims depended on language of CBA, the claims did not substantially depend on a CBA interpretation and could “be resolved by—at most— merely ‘looking to’ the CBAs”). 276 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). 277 San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). 278 Doe v. Google, Inc., 54 Cal. App. 5th 948 (2020). 279 Id. at 960-61. 280 Id. at 963. 281 Id. at 968-69. 282 Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1)(3), (c)(2). SLAPP stands for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation. For cases granting plaintiffs’ anti-SLAPP motions, see Aber v. Comstock, 212 Cal. App. 4th 931 (2013) (upholding anti-SLAPP order against alleged sexual harasser who sued plaintiff for defamation and IIED); cf. Cho v. Chang, 219 Cal. App. 4th 521 (2013) (striking in part alleged harasser’s crosscomplaint for defamation and IIED). 283 Aber v. Comstock, 212 Cal. App. 4th 931 (2013). 284 Id. at 939. 285 Id. at 941-953. 286 AB 3070, adding Code Civ. Proc. § 231.7. 287 Id. 288 Id. 289 Id. 290 Code Civ. Proc. § 231.7(g). 291 King v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n, 52 Cal. App. 5th 675, 720, 730-31 (2020) (the court “cannot find … that the jury awarded the same damages for the defamation and wrongful termination claims” as there was substantial evidence that plaintiff’s reputation had been affected by defamatory statements following his termination). 292 See Davis v. Consol. Freightways, 29 Cal. App. 4th 354, 373 (1994) (there was no basis to find self-compelled publication where no strong compulsion to disclose theft accusation existed, because the former employer had a strict policy against giving prospective employers any information about former employees beyond the dates of their employment). 293 Tilkey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 7 Cal. App. 5th 521, 549-550 (2020) (“The jury concluded that Tilkey was under strong pressure to communicate Allstate’s defamatory statement to another person. There is ample evidence to support this conclusion” as the reason for termination reported on the Form U5 was negative, and employers have access to U5 forms, which meant that Tilkey would have to explain the situation to any prospective employer). 294 Civ. Code § 47(c). 295 McQuirk v. Donnelley, 189 F.3d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1999) (release signed by applicant authorizing former employer to provide information could not, under California law, release future intentional acts of defamation); but see Bardin v. Lockheed Aeronautical Sys. Co., 70 Cal. App. 4th 494, 507 (1999) (release barred defamation claims against former employer). 296 Civil Code § 47(c).
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