©2023 Seyfarth Shaw LLP www.seyfarth.com 2023 Cal-Peculiarities | 305 obligations, and work by a relieved employee during a meal break does not thereby place the employer in violation of its obligations and create liability for premium pay … .”). 240 Carrington v. Starbucks Corp., 30 Cal. App. 5th 504, 524 (2018) (affirming denial of summary judgment to employer and affirming PAGA judgment in favor of employee). 241 Donohue v. AMN Servs., LLC, 11 Cal. 5th 58, 69-70 (2021) (reversing summary judgment to employer). 242 Lab. Code § 512(a). 243 Cicairos v. Summit Logistics, Inc., 133 Cal. App. 4th 949, 963 (2005) (reversing summary judgment to employer; “employers have an ‘affirmative obligation to ensure that workers are actually relieved of all duty’”) (citing DLSE Opinion Letter 2002.01.28, at 1); DLSE Enforcement Policies and Interpretations Manual § 45.2.1 (2002) (“It is the employer’s burden to compel the worker to cease work during the meal period.”). 244 Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1040-41 (2012) (“the employer is not obligated to police meal breaks and ensure no work thereafter is performed. Bona fide relief from duty and the relinquishing of control satisfies the employer’s obligations, and work by a relieved employee during a meal break does not thereby place the employer in violation of its obligations”). With Brinker, the California Supreme Court joined the overwhelming weight of federal case law on this point of California law. See, e.g., Brown v. Federal Express Corp., 249 F.R.D. 580, 585 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (denying class certification and rejecting argument that employers must ensure that employees take breaks); Gabriella v. Wells Fargo Fin., Inc., 2008 WL 3200190 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2008) (denying motion for class certification while applying standard that employers need only make break periods available to its employees); Perez v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc., 253 F.R.D. 508, 514 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (granting motion for summary judgment in part, denying plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, and applying the “make available” standard); Salazar v. Avis Budget Grp., 251 F.R.D. 529 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (denying motion for class certification because class members could not show they were forced to miss breaks); Kenny v. Supercuts, 252 F.R.D. 641, 645 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (same). 245 Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1040 (2012) (“Proof an employer had knowledge of employees working through meal periods will not alone subject the employer to liability for premium pay.”). 246 Esparza v. Safeway, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 5th 42 (2019). 247 Donohue v. AMN Servs., LLC, 11 Cal. 5th 58, 61 (2021) (reversing summary judgment to employer; holding “that time records showing noncompliant meal periods raise a rebuttable presumption of meal period violations, including at the summary judgment stage”). 248 Id. at 77-78. 249 Donohue v. AMN Servs., LLC, 11 Cal. 5th 58, 61 (2021) (reversing summary judgment to employer; holding “that employers cannot engage in the practice of rounding time punches—that is, adjusting the hours that an employee has actually worked to the nearest preset time increment—in the meal period context. The meal period provisions are designed to prevent even minor infringements on meal period requirements, and rounding is incompatible with that objective.”). 250 Donohue v. AMN Servs., LLC, 29 Cal. App. 5th 1068 (2018) (rejecting argument that rounding policy could not apply to meal period punches; trial court need only consider how often policy results in rounding up and down; rejecting argument that plaintiff often got short meal periods and was discouraged from taking them, where signed attestations of meal period compliance accompanied every timesheet reflecting late or short meal periods), rev. granted, No. S253677 (Cal. Mar. 27, 2019). 251 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a). 252 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(b). 253 E.g., Bono v. Enter., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 32 Cal. App. 4th 968, 971, 975-77 (1995) (affirming judgment denying employer’s request for injunctive relief against DLSE enforcement position that employers must pay employee for their meal time if the employer requires the employee to remain on employer premises during lunch; “When an employer directs, commands or restrains an employee from leaving the work place during his or her lunch hour and thus prevents the employee from using the time effectively for his or her own purposes, that employee remains subject to the employer’s control [and] that employee must be paid.”). 254 Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1036 (2012) (“the DLSE argues … the wage order’s meal period requirement is satisfied if the employee (1) has at least 30 minutes uninterrupted, (2) is free to leave the premises, and (3) is relieved of all duty for the entire period [citing DLSE Opinion Letter Nos. 1988.01.05, 1996.07.12]. We agree with this DLSE interpretation of the wage order.”). 255 Rodriguez v. Taco Bell Corp., 896 F.3d 952, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming summary judgment to employer). 256 Godfrey v. Oakland Port Servs. Corp., 230 Cal. App. 4th 1267, 1270 (2014) (affirming judgment to employees; rejecting employer’s argument that California law was preempted by FAAAA, which provides that states may not enact laws “related to … service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property”) (citing People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transp., Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 772, 778 (2014) (reciting presumption against federal preemption traditional state regulation over wages and hours, and holding that FAAAA does not affect UCL claim, not involving meal and rest breaks, by truck drivers claiming that they are employees misclassified as independent contractors). See also Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 2014) (reversing summary judgment to employer; holding that FAAA does not preempt California’s meal-and-rest break laws, even though 9 of 13 federal district court decisions had ruled in favor of employers). 257 49 C.F.R. § 395.3. 258 83 Fed. Reg. at 67, 479. 259 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Loc. 2785 v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 986 F.3d 841, 846 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Trescott v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 142 S. Ct. 93 (2021) (“California’s Labor Commissioner, certain labor organizations, and others now petition for review of the FMCSA’s preemption determination. Because the agency’s decision reflects a permissible interpretation of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 and is not arbitrary or capricious, we deny the petitions for review.”). 260 Lab. Code § 512(e), (f). A valid CBA qualifies for that exemption if it “expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of employees, and expressly provides for meal periods for those employees, final and binding arbitration of disputes concerning
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