©2024 Seyfarth Shaw LLP www.seyfarth.com 2024 Cal-Peculiarities | 133 16 Lab. Code § 229 (“Actions to enforce the provisions of this article for the collection of due and unpaid wages claimed by an individual may be maintained without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.”). 17 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1987). 18 Lane v. Francis Capital Mgmt. LLC, 224 Cal. App. 4th 676 (2014) (plaintiff could proceed to trial on wage claim because employer, in moving to compel arbitration, did not show that the relevant transaction was in interstate commerce). 19 E.g., New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 541 (2019) (interstate trucking company sued by truck driver for misclassifying him as an independent contractor could not invoke the FAA to enforce the parties’ arbitration agreement, because the FAA Section 1 exclusion for “contracts of employment of … [transportation] workers engaged in … interstate commerce” is broad enough to embrace independent contractors). See also Muller v. Roy Miller Freight Lines LLC, 34 Cal. App. 5th 1056 (2019) (applying section 229 of the Labor Code to defeat employer’s effort to enforce arbitration agreement as to claims for unpaid wages, because the FAA Section 1 exclusion applies to truck drivers who transport goods that mostly originate outside California, even if plaintiffs transported the goods solely within California); Nieto v. Fresno Beverage Co., 33 Cal. App. 5th 274 (2019) (same as to delivery driver transporting beer and other beverages manufactured outside of California and then stored in defendant’s California warehouse before transport; although plaintiff did not drive across state lines, he transported goods in stream of interstate commerce after short pause in California and thus was a transportation worker engaged in interstate commerce). 20 Bravo v. RADC Enters., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 5th 920, 923 (2019) (“The choice-of-law provision becomes consistent with the parties’ intent to arbitrate all disputes when we read ‘the laws of the State of California’ to include substantive principles California courts would apply, but to exclude special rules limiting the authority of arbitrators.”) (emphasis in original). 21 Civ. Code § 51.7 (“Ralph Civil Rights Act”) (entitling persons “to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property” because of race, religion, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, or position in a labor dispute). 22 Civ. Code § 52.1 (“Tom Bane Civil Rights Act”) (providing right of action “if a person interferes … or attempts to interfere, by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment of … rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States”). 23 Civ. Code §§ 51.7(c)(3), 52.1. 24 Saheli v. White Mem’l Med. Ctr., 21 Cal. App. 5th 308, 323 (2018) (FAA preempts any state rule discriminating on its face against arbitration). 25 Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Bonta, 62 F.4th 473 (9th Cir. 2023). 26 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,10 (1984). 27 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1987) (FAA preempts California Labor Code section 229, banning arbitration of wage claims, so plaintiff must abide by agreement to arbitrate pursuant to a Form U-4 agreement). Section 229 remains in the Labor Code. 28 Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353-54 (2008). 29 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011). 30 See Discover Bank v. Sup. Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005) (in contract of adhesion, arbitration provisions that waive class actions are void as against public policy). 31 Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 51 Cal. 4th 659 (2011) (“Sonic I”). 32 Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 132 S. Ct. 496 (2011) (remanding to Supreme Court of California for further consideration in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011)). On remand, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that the FAA, as interpreted by Concepcion, preempts any categorical bar on Berman hearing waivers. Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court insisted that unconscionability could still be found, on a case-by-case basis, and that a Berman hearing waiver may be considered a relevant factor supporting an ultimate finding of unconscionability. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 57 Cal. 4th 1109 ( 2013) (“Sonic II”) (unconscionability remains a valid defense against enforcement of arbitration agreements). 33 Direct TV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015). 34 Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1412-13 (2019). 35 Id. at 1412-13. 36 Id. at 1416. Lamps Plus followed the U.S. Supreme Court case in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010), which held that parties who have not contracted for class arbitration may not be forced to arbitrate class claims, and that class arbitration was inappropriate to order where the arbitration agreement was silent on class arbitration. 37 Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000). 38 E.g., Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 164 Cal. App. 4th 494 (2008) (upholding denial of motion to compel arbitration of suit for employment discrimination; arbitration agreement was unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, because employee had to sign it to be hired, and because agreement gave arbitrator sole authority to determine arbitrability, required employee to pay costs unique to arbitration, deprived employees of right to recover statutory costs and reasonable attorney fees if employee prevailed, and limited employee to one deposition; trial court could declare entire agreement unconscionable rather than severing unconscionable provisions where unconscionable provisions governing arbitrability, discovery, and costs permeated entire agreement). Ontiveros has since been abrogated as to its conclusion that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable simply by virtue of delegating the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator. See Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 231, 248-50 (2014) (recognizing Ontiveros’s abrogation in light of Rent-ACenter, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010), which held that such delegation clauses are valid absent a challenge specific to the delegation clause). 39 Ramos v. Sup. Court, 28 Cal. App. 5th 1042, 1057-58 (2018) (holding it was unnecessary to first find whether law firm “income partner” was an employee of the firm, since the firm had a superior bargaining position akin to that of an employer-employee relationship). See also Ali v. Daylight Transp., LLC, 59 Cal. App. 5th 462 (2020) (applying Armendariz to arbitration agreement between transportation company and truck drivers classified as independent contractors); Subcontracting Concepts (CT), LLC v. De Melo, 34 Cal. App. 5th 201, 209-10
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