140 | 2024 Cal-Peculiarities ©2024 Seyfarth Shaw LLP www.seyfarth.com Cal. App. 4th 1367, 1383 (2015) (employee may assert a public-policy tort claim for disability discrimination without satisfying FEHA’s then one-year statute of limitations). 194 Gould v. Maryland Sound Indus., Inc., 31 Cal. App. 4th 1137, 1148 (1995) (Labor Code section 216 expresses fundamental public policy for prompt payment of wages and forbids firing employee to avoid paying commissions earned). 195 Vasquez v. Franklin Mgmt. Real Estate Fund, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 4th 819, 828-29 (2013). 196 Galeotti v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local No. 3, 48 Cal. App. 5th 850, 863 (2020). 197 Garcia v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1556, 1562 (1986) (wrongful demotion or suspension without pay is actionable as breach of public policy). Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 1093-95 (1992), criticized Garcia to the extent that Garcia indicated that a tort action does not need to be rooted in either a statute or a constitutional provision. 198 Baker v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Diego, 2015 WL 1344958, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2015) (rejecting claim of wrongful termination in violation of FEHA’s public policy against disability discrimination, because California law does not recognize “a claim for tortious nonrenewal of an employment contract”); Touchstone Television Prod. v. Superior Ct. (Sheridan), 208 Cal. App. 4th 676, 680-81 (2012) (rejecting tort claim by “Desperate Housewives” actress that the television producer refused to renew her contract in retaliation for her raising safety concerns); see also Daly v. Exxon Corp., 55 Cal. App. 4th 39, 45 (1997) (rejecting claim of wrongful termination for failure to renew contract that expired by its terms; use of “wrongful termination” is a “misnomer” where the “employment contract is for a fixed term and expires”); Motevalli v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 122 Cal. App. 4th 97, 113 (2004) (“The District did not terminate Motevalli—she was a probationary teacher, working under an emergency credential, whose contract was not renewed. ... Motevalli was incapable of amending her complaint to allege a new cause of action for tortious nonrenewal of her employment contract in violation of public policy because no such cause of action is recognized.”). 199 Touchstone, 208 Cal. App. 4th at 682; Daly, 55 Cal. App. 4th at 46. 200 Pen. Code § 290.46. 201 See www.meganslaw.ca.gov (last visited Mar. 4, 2023). 202 Pen. Code § 290.46(j)(1), (2)(E). 203 Pen. Code § 290.46(j)(4)(A), (B). 204 See, e.g., Donaleski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2009 WL 1296257, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2009) (Penal Code does not prohibit employer from discharging the plaintiff for a felony conviction even if employer first learned of possible conviction through a co-worker’s statement that the plaintiff’s name appeared on the Megan’s Law Website, where the co-worker had not looked at the website at the employer’s direction and where the employer did not consult the Website or discharge the plaintiff for being listed on the Website, but rather discharged the plaintiff after an independent investigation confirmed the felony conviction). 205 See Edu. Code § 45122.1(a) (school districts must not employ someone “convicted of a violent or serious felony”). 206 Lab. Code § 2922: “An employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other. Employment for a specified term means an employment for a period greater than one month.” 207 See generally Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 336-37 (2000). 208 Id. at 340 (“[D]isclaimer language in an employee manual or policy manual does not necessarily mean an employee is employed at will”); Stillwell v. Salvation Army, 167 Cal. App. 4th 360, 382-83 (2008) (employer not entitled to reversal of judgment for breach of implied-in-fact contract of continued employment even though several employee handbooks during plaintiff’s tenure recited that employment was at will). 209 Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 340 n.10 (2000) (collecting cases holding that an express at-will agreement signed by the employee cannot be overcome by proof of a contrary implied understanding). 210 Id. at 340 & n. 11 (handbook disclaimer language is not controlling, but may be considered as evidence of at-will employment: “the more clear, prominent, complete, consistent, and all-encompassing the disclaimer language,” the greater the likelihood that the parties intended the employment to be at will). 211 Nelson v. United Techs., 74 Cal. App. 4th 597, 615 (1999) (affirming finding of implied contract notwithstanding at-will language in job application that by its terms was not “intended in any way to create an employment contract”). See generally Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child & Family Servs., 207 Cal. App. 4th 1511, 1522 (2012) (declining to enforce arbitration clause contained within a handbook that stated, “This Handbook is not intended to create a contract of employment …”). 212 Scott v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 11 Cal. 4th 454, 473-74 (1995). 213 Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 345-46 (2000) (triable issue exists that dismissed employees could rely on RIF guidelines as part of implied contract, even though guidelines not distributed to employees generally). 214 CACI 2404—Breach of Employment Contract—Unspecified Term—”Good Cause” Defined. 215 Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall, 17 Cal. 4th 93, 107-09 (1998). 216 Silva v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 4th 256, 275 (1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer on claim for breach of an implied contract to terminate only for good cause: “While the investigation was not perfect, it was appropriate given that it was conducted ‘under the exigencies of the workaday world and without benefit of the slow-moving machinery of a contested trial”). 217 Serri v. Santa Clara Univ., 226 Cal. App. 4th 830, 873-74 (2014) (affirming summary judgment for employer on breach of implied contract claim, and rejecting plaintiff’s claim that a jury should decide whether her misconduct was serious enough to warrant immediate termination under the Cotran good cause standard). 218 Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 353 n.18 (2000) (“[T]he covenant prevents a party from acting in bad faith to frustrate the contract’s actual benefits. Thus, for example, the covenant might be violated if termination of an at-will employee was a mere pretext to cheat the worker out of another contract benefit to which the employee was clearly entitled, such as compensation already earned”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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