©2024 Seyfarth Shaw LLP www.seyfarth.com 2024 Cal-Peculiarities | 143 280 Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1054 1071 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting LMRA preemption argument because, although claims depended on language of CBA, the claims did not substantially depend on a CBA interpretation and could “be resolved by—at most— merely ‘looking to’ the CBAs”). 281 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). 282 San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). 283 Doe v. Google, Inc., 54 Cal. App. 5th 948 (2020). 284 Id. at 960-61. 285 Id. at 963. 286 Id. at 968-69. 287 Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1)(3), (c)(2). SLAPP stands for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation. For cases granting plaintiffs’ anti-SLAPP motions, see Aber v. Comstock, 212 Cal. App. 4th 931 (2013) (upholding anti-SLAPP order against alleged sexual harasser who sued plaintiff for defamation and IIED); cf. Cho v. Chang, 219 Cal. App. 4th 521 (2013) (striking in part alleged harasser’s crosscomplaint for defamation and IIED). 288 Aber v. Comstock, 212 Cal. App. 4th 931 (2013). 289 Id. at 939. 290 Id. at 941-953. 291 AB 3070, adding Civ. Proc. Code § 231.7. 292 Id. 293 Id. 294 Id. 295 Civ. Proc. Code § 231.7(g). 296 King v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 52 Cal. App. 5th 675, 720, 730-31 (2020) (the court “cannot find … that the jury awarded the same damages for the defamation and wrongful termination claims” as there was substantial evidence that plaintiff’s reputation had been affected by defamatory statements following his termination). 297 See Davis v. Consol. Freightways, 29 Cal. App. 4th 354, 373 (1994) (there was no basis to find self-compelled publication where no strong compulsion to disclose theft accusation existed, because the former employer had a strict policy against giving prospective employers any information about former employees beyond the dates of their employment). 298 Tilkey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 7 Cal. App. 5th 521, 549-550 (2020) (“The jury concluded that Tilkey was under strong pressure to communicate Allstate’s defamatory statement to another person. There is ample evidence to support this conclusion” as the reason for termination reported on the Form U5 was negative, and employers have access to U5 forms, which meant that Tilkey would have to explain the situation to any prospective employer). 299 Civ. Code § 47(c). 300 McQuirk v. Donnelley, 189 F.3d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1999) (release signed by applicant authorizing former employer to provide information could not, under California law, release future intentional acts of defamation); but see Bardin v. Lockheed Aeronautical Sys. Co., 70 Cal. App. 4th 494, 507 (1999) (release barred defamation claims against former employer). 301 Civ. Code § 47(c). 302 Civ. Code § 47.1. 303 Id. 304 Toscano v. Greene Music, 124 Cal. App. 4th 685 (2004) (plaintiff, suing for promissory estoppel stemming from defendant’s unfulfilled alleged promise of employment, causing plaintiff to resign from at-will job at former employer, can recover what wages he would have earned from former employer through retirement, to extent damages not speculative). 305 Helmer v. Bingham Toyota Isuzu, 129 Cal. App. 4th 1121 (2005) (plaintiff can recover damages for lost income suffered from leaving secure job due to false promises about monthly compensation he would earn at defendant). See also § 5.6 (claims for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 306 Helmer v. Bingham Toyota Isuzu, 129 Cal. App. 4th 1121 (2005). 307 White v. Smule, Inc., 75 Cal. App. 5th 346, 357-59 (2022) (“[A]n ‘at-will’ employer does not have carte blanche to lie to an employee about any matter whatsoever to trick him or her into accepting employment” and at-will employment does not establish that an employee’s reliance on an employer’s promises regarding the kind, character, or existence of work the employee was hired to perform is unreasonable) (internal citations omitted). 308 Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 14 Cal. 4th 1066, 1081-82 (1997) (“we view this case as a ‘misleading half-truths’ situation in which defendants, having undertaken to provide some information regarding Gadams’s teaching credentials and character, were obliged to disclose all other facts which ‘materially qualify’ the limited facts disclosed” and “having volunteered this information, defendants were obliged to complete the picture by disclosing material facts regarding charges and complaints of Gadams’s sexual improprieties.”) 309 Marshall v. Brown, 141 Cal. App. 3d 408, 418-19 (1983) (where plaintiff recovered both a treble damage award under Labor Code section 1054 and punitive damages, the plaintiff was required to elect between the two penalties, as the primary purpose behind both is to punish the defendant and “we do not sanction a double recovery for the plaintiff”). 310 Cf. Doe v. Cap. Cities, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1038, 1046 (1996) (no liability for negligent retention of alleged sexual harasser where employer had no prior knowledge of relevant propensities).
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy OTkwMTQ4