146 | 2024 Cal-Peculiarities ©2024 Seyfarth Shaw LLP www.seyfarth.com 356 Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17203, 17204. 357 Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Ct. (First Transit, Inc.), 46 Cal. 4th 993 (2009). 358 California Med. Ass’n v. Aetna Health of Cal., Inc., 14 Cal. 5th 1075 (2023). 359 Id. at 1091-93. 360 Id. at 1082. 361 E.g., Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2018) (“A collective action is instituted when workers join a collective action complaint by filing opt-in forms with the district court.”); Rangel v. PLS Check Cashers of Cal., Inc., 899 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2018) (“FLSA collective actions, unlike Rule 23(b)(3) class actions and their state law analogues, are strictly opt-in actions.”) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) (emphasis in original); Misra v. Decision One Mortg. Co., LLC, 673 F. Supp. 2d 987, 992 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“Potential collective action plaintiffs must ‘opt-in’ to the action by filing a written consent with the court…. If similarly situated employees do not ‘optin’ to the collective action, these employees are not bound by any judgment reached in the action.”) (citing Leuthold v. Destination Am., Inc., 224 F.R.D. 462, 466 (N.D. Cal. 2004)). 362 E.g., Haro v. City of Rosemead, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1067, 1077 (2009) (“As a matter of California law, appellants cannot maintain their FLSA action as a section 382 class action where other employees must opt in to join the putative class.”); Chavez v. Netflix, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 4th 43, 59 (2008) (“[R]equiring class members to take affirmative steps to opt in has been held to be contrary to state … class action law and policy.”) (citing Hypertouch, Inc. v. Superior Ct. (Perry Johnson, Inc.), 128 Cal. App. 4th 1527, 1550 (2005)). 363 Compare In re Bayol Cases I and II, 51 Cal. 4th 751, 757-58 (2011) (if state order terminates class claims, with individual claims persisting, then the order is immediately appealable) with Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582 U.S. 23, 25 (2017) (federal order denying class certification is an interlocutory order, not reviewable as of right until a final judgment) and Fed. Rule Civ. P. 23(f) (federal order denying class certification can under limited circumstances be subject to a discretionary appeal). 364 See Parris v. Superior Ct. (Lowe’s HI W, Inc.), 109 Cal. App. 4th 285 (2003) (pre-certification communication by plaintiff’s counsel to individuals in potential class is constitutionally protected; trial court erred in denying motion for approval of content of such proposed communication, as motion was unnecessary; court also erred in denying motion to compel discovery of names and addresses of potential class members, where court did not expressly balance potential abuse of class action procedure against rights of parties). 365 E.g., Lab. Code §§ 218.5 (wage claims), 2699 (penalty claims). 366 Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 23 Cal. 4th 163, 179 (2000) (Any action on any UCL cause of action is subject to the four-year period of limitations created by section 17208 of the California Business & Professions Code). 367 Landers v. Quality Commc’ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 638, 644 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding dismissal of FLSA claim of cable services installer that his employer failed to pay him and similarly situated individuals minimum and overtime wages, where he failed to allege facts showing there was a specific week in which he was denied minimum or overtime wages; the pleading standards the U.S. Supreme Court set forth in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (requiring complaint to plead facts to state an antitrust claim for relief that is plausible on its face), also apply to FLSA claims, meaning “that conclusory allegations that merely recite the statutory language are [not] adequate”). 368 Gutierrez v. Cal. Com. Club, 187 Cal. App. 4th 969, 972 (2010). See also Prince v. CLS Transp., Inc., 118 Cal. App. 4th 1320 (2004) (trial court erred in determining class action suitability of wage-dispute case at pleading stage; Labor Commissioner hearings are not a superior method of resolution for a class of 500 drivers). 369 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350-51, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (“sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question … and certification is proper only if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied”; “[A]ctual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains ... indispensable. Frequently that ‘rigorous analysis’ will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim. That cannot be helped.”) (internal citations omitted). 370 Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470 (1981). 371 See Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC, 51 Cal. App. 5th 299, 310 (2020) (99 Cents “argued the proposed classes should not be certified because individual issues predominate.”). 372 Id. at 307. 373 Id. 374 Id. at 336 (“[T]he court had the duty to scrutinize all the declarations and the authority to strike any of them if it found evidence of coercion or abuse.”) (emphasis in original). 375 Id. at 333-34. 376 Id. at 340 (“[N]o court has ever overturned a certification order based on an evidentiary ruling without determining whether the ruling affected the order. This is a first.”) (emphasis in original). 377 Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 34 Cal. 4th 319 (2004). 378 Id. at 331; accord Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1026 (2012). 379 Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc., 34 Cal. 4th at 326-27; accord Brinker Rest. Corp., 53 Cal. 4th at 1022 (presuming “in favor of the certification order … the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the record”). 380 Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc., 34 Cal. 4th at 340. 381 Id. at 327, 329 n.4. 382 Id. at 327, 332. 383 Id. at 327-28. 384 Id. at 343.
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