Developments In Equal Pay Litigation - 2022 Update

30 | Developments in Equal Pay Litigation © 2022 Seyfarth Shaw LLP compensation policies, individual teachers were placed into different “steps” and “lanes,” depending on their experience and level of education. There were also unwritten guidelines for lateral hires that would allow, in some circumstances, for individual teachers to be hired “above-step.” 233 The employer articulated five reasons that might justify hiring a teacher with an above-step compensation: (1) an “acute” need to hire teachers with certain certifications or skillsets; (2) a need to fill sudden vacancies; (3) a need to secure the best possible “rock star” teachers; (4) a candidate's excellent credentials or experience and their ability to negotiate a higher salary; and (5) the economic reality at the time of hiring. 234 The court fairly quickly dispensed with the employer’s arguments regarding Plaintiffs’ prima facie case on the basis that each Plaintiff and their chosen comparators were all teachers within the same district. 235 And although the employer school district was able to show with respect to each comparator that there were various reasons why those comparators may have been hired above-step, the court could not say, at the summary judgment stage, that any of those proffered reasons actually justified the wage disparity: “The Record here reflects a busload of similarly nondiscriminatory reasons that could in theory explain the Step disparities. However, there is little to no direct or inferential evidence that any administrators or School Board Directors were actually motivated to recommend hiring or to hire the comparators above- Step because : (1) they were specially qualified; (2) they had desirable experience; (3) the District needed flexibility in placement; (4) the District was facing a pressing need at the time; (5) the District needed to quickly fill vacancies; (6) the comparator negotiated; or (7) the comparator indicated she would not accept unless given commensurate salary.” 236 However, the same discretionary elements mean that plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment either: “While this hiring method seems to permit a level of discretion that could allow for sex-based discrimination, it is the province of the jury to determine when, how, and if at all the District did in fact base its decisions on nondiscriminatory factors.” 237 Accordingly, both cross motions for summary judgment were denied. Similarly, in Melgoza v. Rush University Medical Center , 238 an Assistant Vice President of a medical center alleged that she was paid less than comparable males. The employer argued that any pay discrepancy was due to factors other than sex; in particular, it argued that it pays Assistant Vice Presidents according to a pay grade system that is determined based on job description, responsibilities, skills, and education. 239 However, the court found that some of those positions were not graded. Rather, the medical center sometimes identified a position as “admin/tech manager 28,” which did not have any minimum or maximum salary associated with it. 240 Because that grade had been assigned to plaintiff and her chosen comparators, the court held that the pay grade system did not explain the pay differential: “[e]ven assuming for the sake of argument that [employer’s] grading system applied to all AVPs, [employer] does not explain how that system resulted in the actual salary differentials.” 241 Another recent case clarified that an employer cannot defend a pay equity claim by pointing to a mistake that was made in placing an employee within its compensation hierarchy. In Johnson v. Canyon County, Idaho , 242 four female Licensed Practical Nurses alleged that they were paid less than their male counterparts for equal work. The employer argued that the salary differential was the result of a mistake, whereby one of plaintiffs’ male comparators was assigned a code for a Registered Nurse when he was hired and was paid more as a result of that mistake. 243 The court held that the “factor other than sex” affirmative defense had to be read in light of the other three affirmative defenses, which all relate to job 233 Id. 234 Id. at *4. 235 Id. at *13. 236 Id. at *15 (emphasis in original). 237 Id. at *21 (emphasis in original). 238 Melgoza v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr. , No. 17-cv-6819, 2020 WL 6565235 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2020). 239 Id. at *7. 240 Id. 241 Id. 242 Johnson v. Canyon Cnty., Idaho , No. 1:19-cv-364-BLW, 2020 WL 5077731 (D. Idaho Aug. 27, 2020). 243 Id. at *1.