18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

238 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition motion and denied Plaintiffs’ motion as to the wage statement claim. The Court therefore granted in part and denied in part the motions. (vii) Coverage In FLSA Collective Actions Adams, et al. v. Palm Beach County , 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191114 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of unpaid volunteers at golf courses, filed a class and collective action alleging that Defendant failed to pay them wages in violation of the FLSA and the Florida Minimum Wage Act. The Court previously had dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint with leave to amend. After filing a second amended complaint, Defendant again moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Court granted the motion. Plaintiffs were bag drop attendants, rangers, driving range attendants, and starter’s assistants, and although not paid wages, they were offered discounted rounds of golf and free golf balls to hit at the driving range in return for their work. Defendant solicited for volunteers through the Parks & Recreation Department with a posting listing the requirements and specifying that the position was on a volunteer basis. Defendant argued that the privilege to play golf at a reduced fee and to use the driving range for free was a reasonable benefit or nominal fee as described in the FLSA. Plaintiffs asserted that the $91 for a round of golf that they saved by volunteering counted as wages such that they were actually employees, and therefore should receive the minimum wage. The Court disagreed. Instead, it agreed with Defendant that the discounted golf rounds were, at most, a reasonable benefit or nominal fee. The Court noted that the positions were clearly and unequivocally advertised as volunteer positions, which never mentioned payment of wages. Defendant’s job postings also listed discounted golf as something the volunteer could “enjoy,” which was equivalent to being outdoors and getting to know others with similar interests, neither of which would equal compensable wages. Id . at *6. The Court found nothing inherent about the job or job duties that would reasonably suggest that wages necessarily would be paid. The Court opined that it was not objectively reasonable to expect wages when one signed up for a position advertised for volunteers, that can be performed by volunteers, and then are not paid wages. Looking to the totality of the relationship between the parties, the Court reasoned that the ability to play golf at a reduced fee was a reasonable benefit that was consistent with the economic realities of the particular situation. Id . at *11-12. The Court held that Plaintiffs alleged nothing to conclude that Defendant suffered a loss of other revenue due to the benefit provided to volunteers. The Court ruled that Plaintiffs were receiving a reasonable, non-compensatory, limited, golf-related benefit for volunteering at a golf course. The Court further explained that its conclusion was consistent with the U.S. Department of Labor regulations, under which reasonable benefits include “inclusion of individual volunteers in group insurance plans (such as liability, health, life, disability, workers’ compensation) or pension plans or ‘length of service’ awards.” Id . at *14. The Court therefore held that the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim that Plaintiffs were "employees" under the FLSA and it dismissed Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. Id . Pratt, et al. v. Securus Technologies, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82661 (D. Me. April 30, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of formerly incarcerated individuals, filed a class action alleging that Defendant, a telecommunications company, violated federal and Maine wiretap laws when it recorded phone calls between attorneys and their clients and distributed those recordings to law enforcement officials and prosecutors. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court granted. Plaintiffs asserted that the harm that they suffered or risked suffering due to Defendant’s allegedly illegal conduct was the violation of their attorney-client privilege. Defendant asserted that even if the allegations were true, they were insufficient to establish that any of the allegedly unlawfully recorded phone calls were subject to the attorney-client privilege, and thus Plaintiffs failed to establish a concrete injury traceable to the recordings. Defendant further contended that Plaintiffs’ complaint failed to provide sufficient factual allegations to show that any particular, allegedly recorded phone call satisfied the requirements for privilege. The Court disagreed with Defendant’s position. It ruled that the complaint sufficiently set forth facts from which a violation of the attorney-client privilege might be found and, therefore, Plaintiffs had standing to sue. Defendant also argued that Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim that Defendant violated the federal or Maine wiretap statutes, because the complaint did not plausibly allege that Defendant intentionally recorded privileged phone calls. The Court agreed. It observed that the Federal Wiretap Act and an analogous state statute in Maine prohibited “the intentional ‘interception of telephone conversations, subject to certain exceptions . . . without a court order.’" Id . at *11. Plaintiffs contended that the intentionality requirement was satisfied by the allegation that Defendant intentionally engaged in the conduct of recording phone calls made to and from those facilities. The Court, however, determined that anything less than intentional interception was