18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

252 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition spent by employees performing work before and/or after their scheduled shifts. Id . at 7. The Court of Federal Claims determined that Plaintiffs’ claims in this case did not turn on the issues resolved by the grievance settlement. Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims denied Defendant’s motion. It held that Plaintiffs’ allegations that they were scheduled on night shifts and not paid the shift differential pay were not resolved by the previous grievance settlement and therefore not barred by res judicata. Campbell, et al. v. City Of New York, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40933 (S.D.N.Y. March 4, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of employees of the New York City Department of Homeless Services, filed a collective action against the City of New York for failing to pay overtime, properly calculate overtime hours, and make timely overtime payments in violation of the FLSA. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the Court granted Defendant’s motion and denied Plaintiffs’ motion. First, Plaintiffs contended that they worked eight and a half hour shifts, with an unpaid 30-minute break each day. However, Plaintiffs asserted that they regularly worked prior to their shifts and after their shifts were over without being paid overtime compensation. Due to the nature of Plaintiffs work, which involved addressing emergency situations like arrests and medical crises, the Court agreed as a matter of "just and reasonable inference" that Plaintiffs were often required to perform work duties outside of their shifts and during their unpaid meal breaks. Id. at *20. Plaintiffs argued that they were in fact working during these hours without compensation, as well as many times during their meal breaks. Defendant did not meaningfully contest that Plaintiffs actually worked unpaid overtime hours in its motion, and therefore, the Court found no genuine dispute of material fact that Plaintiffs worked uncompensated overtime hours. The Court reasoned that neither party met their burden of showing that no dispute of material fact existed as to whether Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that such hours went uncompensated. Defendant argued that it had a functioning system for Plaintiffs to request overtime pay, and therefore it should not be expected to have knowledge of Plaintiffs working unpaid overtime hours before and after shifts and during meal breaks. Id . at *22-23. The parties also contested the actual rate of approval for overtime requests. The Court noted that materials issues of fact existed as to whether the overtime requests were regularly approved. The Court opined that if Plaintiff had no legitimate basis for believing they would not be approved, then Defendant should not be expected to know that Plaintiffs were working unpaid overtime; and if Defendant had a policy or practice of denying these requests, then Defendant should have been aware that Plaintiffs would sometimes have to unexpectedly work overtime due to the emergent nature of their responsibilities and that these hours would go unpaid. Id . at *23. The Court explained that due to the disputed facts, summary judgment must be denied for the overtime claims. In addition, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant improperly delayed overtime payments. The Court previously had dismissed these claims for all Plaintiffs except Plaintiff Campbell, because that was the only Plaintiff for whom the complaint asserted any factual allegations. Defendant moved for summary judgment as to this claim because Plaintiffs provide "no admissible evidence" of any alleged delayed payments and that Plaintiff Campbell had not suffered any monetary damages as a result of delayed payments. Id . at *25. The Court agreed that Plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence or make any arguments with regards to their delayed payment claims. Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. In sum, the Court granted in part Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. Chagoya, et al. v. City Of Chicago, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 8722 (7th Cir. March 25, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of members of the Chicago Police Department’s Special Weapons and Tactics (“SWAT”) Unit, brought actions on behalf of themselves and other similarly-situated SWAT Operators alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”), and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA”). Plaintiffs alleged that when they took their SWAT equipment home, they were required to store some of that equipment inside their residences that could not be left in their vehicles. Plaintiffs sought compensation for the off-duty time required to transport, load, unload, and store their gear inside of their residences. Defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims, and Plaintiffs filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the FLSA and IMWL claims. Defendant argued that the off-duty driving and transportation of SWAT weapons and gear during normal commutes between home and work were not tasks integral and indispensable to the SWAT operators’ principal activities. Defendant maintained that SWAT operators were permitted to store their SWAT equipment at work, without taking their gear home, and were still able to perform their principal activities. Finally, Defendant contended that there was no promise, agreement, or practice of compensating operators for the time spent during a normal commute or for loading and unloading equipment as