18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

278 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition be engaged in "work." Id . at *15-16. The Court reviewed Plaintiffs’ testimony and concluded that they were able to pursue their personal pursuits during the on-call time such that the time would not be compensable under the FLSA. The Court found that each Representative Plaintiff testified as to essentially the same facts with only small variances. Id . at *20. Despite the small variances, all Plaintiffs testified that no prohibition on many personal pursuits was enforced under the policy, and therefore the Court determined that summary judgment to Defendant was warranted. For these reasons, the Court granted Defendant’s motion. Wilson, et al. v. Peckham, Inc. , 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138338 (W.D. Mich. July 26, 2021). Plaintiff, a call center employee, filed a collective action alleging violations of the FLSA. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court converted into a motion for summary judgment because Defendant relied on information not properly before the Court on a motion to dismiss. The Court denied Defendant’s motion. Plaintiff asserted that Defendant failed to pay for required pre-shift work, work performed during 30-minute meal breaks, and that it miscalculated the overtime rate of pay. As to the pre-shift work, Plaintiff contended that call center agents were entitled to compensation for the time spent booting up and logging-in to their computers before they clock-in at the start of the day, a process which sometimes required up to 60 minutes because the computers were slow or because of technical problems. The Court determined that viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, there were sufficient facts from which a reasonable jury could infer that the boot-up and log-in process was compensable as a principal activity, which was integral and indispensable to the work for which agents were hired. Id . at *15. The Court therefore denied the motion as to the pre-shift work claim. As to the break time work, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to pay its agents for compensable time worked during the day, including time worked during meal breaks and time used for unscheduled breaks of less than 20 minutes in duration. Id . at *16. Plaintiff asserted that although Defendant provided a 30-minute unpaid meal break per shift, it required agents to be ready to receive calls by the end of their break and therefore had to return from break early without compensation. Defendant argued that the time was de minimis . The Court reasoned that at the summary judgment stage, resolving whether or not the time spent during lunch breaks was de minimis would not be appropriate. Finally, Plaintiff asserted that Defendant used the base hourly rate as the regular rate and did not account for shift premiums paid to agents above their base rate when calculating overtime compensation. Defendant argued that it had changed the calculations and repaid any monies owed to the agents. However, the Court reasoned that Defendant raised this argument for the first time in its reply brief, and therefore it would not grant Defendant ’ s motion when Plaintiff did not have a chance to file a response. Accordingly, the Court denied Defendant’s motion in its entirety. Wojciehowicz, et al. v. Chemours Co. FC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177513 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 17, 2021). Plaintiff, a general maintenance mechanic, filed a collective action alleging that Defendant failed to pay overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Court granted. Plaintiff worked a four-day workweek from 7:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. with an unpaid 30-minute meal break each day. Employees were expected to be at their work location and dressed in company-provided personal protective equipment (“PPE”) by their scheduled start time, and to change out of and leave used PPE at the end of a shift. Plaintiff asserted that he typically arrived 5 to 10 minutes early, changed into his PPE, and drove or rode in a company vehicle to the location where a safety meeting was held. At the end of the day, he put away tools, showered, changed, left his used PPE in a designated container to be cleaned, and usually badged out of the facility between 5:15 p.m. and 5:20 p.m. Id . at *8. Plaintiff contended that employees typically left at about 5:18 p.m. because time was calculated on 12-minute blocks and would thus be rounded to 5:30 p.m. Defendant argued that it was entitled to summary judgement on Plaintiff’s overtime claim because the facts established that Plaintiff did not work over 40 hours in a workweek. Defendant asserted that the time spent donning protective gear was not compensable because its informal policy or practice permitted employees to take clean PPE home and dress offsite and showering at the end of shift was not required. Id . at *9. Further, Defendant contended that the badge logs indicated that Plaintiff consistently clocked-out of the facility 12 to 15 minutes early, while arriving only 5 to 10 minutes before his scheduled start time. Id . The Court noted that the facts presented by the parties established that employees were required to wear PPE and were required to leave used PPE at the end of their shift. The parties disputed whether employees could bring clean PPE home to don prior to driving to work. The Court opined that given the fact that employees had to leave their worn PPE at the end of the workday and change into street clothes, bringing clean PPE home rather than changing on arrival would be illogical. The Court thus reasoned that pertinent case law precedent and the undisputed facts established that donning and doffing time under these circumstances was compensable. Id . at *10-11. The Court also ruled that the