18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

286 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition because it is incorporated in Delaware with a principal place of business in Oklahoma, and was therefore not "at home" in Kentucky. Id . at *3. In addition, Defendant argued that personal jurisdiction was lacking because Plaintiff failed to demonstrate compliance with Kentucky’s long-arm statute. The Court found that based on the clear record before it, AROP was a non-resident, and therefore it assessed whether the requirements of the long-arm statute were met to confer personal jurisdiction. The Court opined that it was undisputed that AROP was a limited partnership organized under the laws of Delaware with its principle place of business located in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Viewing the pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court held that jurisdictional discovery was warranted because Plaintiff demonstrated some evidence that AROP was an alter- ego of the other Defendants. In support of the alter-ego theory, Plaintiff asserted that ARMG was the managing partner of both ARLP, and AROP. Id . at *12. Thus, based on these facts, the Court reasoned that Plaintiff demonstrated some evidence of shared management between ARMG, ARLP, Alliance Coal, and AROP. The Court thus ordered limited jurisdictional discovery into the relationship between AROP and ARMG, ARLP, and Alliance Coal prior to making a final determination regarding personal jurisdiction over Defendant AROP. Hanna, et al. v. S-L Distribution Co. , 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1688 (M.D. Penn. Jan. 6, 2021). Plaintiff, an independent contractor, filed a class action alleging that Defendant, a wholesale food product distributor, improperly withheld wages for work-related expenses in violation of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the Court granted. Defendant hired independent contractors, and required the individuals to form corporations, called "IBOs," to distribute its snack products. Plaintiff was an IBO and testified that IBOs typically work exclusively for Defendant and deliver the snack products from warehouses to customers. Defendant then remitted payment to Plaintiff after making certain withholdings, including route loan repayments, truck loan repayments, rental repayments, and electronic equipment charges. Id . at *2. Defendant also held withdrawals for work expenses, including for gas, vehicle maintenance/repairs, and insurance. Id . The Court noted that prior to filing suit, Plaintiff opted-in to a FLSA collective action lawsuit alleging similar claims against Defendant entitled Mode, et al. v. S-L Distribution Co., LLC . Defendant contended that Plaintiff should have asserted her Illinois state law claim in Mode because it arose from the same set of facts against the same party. The Court held that under the split-claims doctrine, the state law claims must be dismissed. The Court noted that both Mode and Plaintiff’s case involved Plaintiff and Defendant, both arose from the business relationship between the parties, and both lawsuits contained similar language and allegations. Therefore, the Court held that it would be required to examine the same evidence as in Mode to determine whether Plaintiff was an employee. Further, the Court opined that since counsel was the same in both matters, they could have sought amendment to include Plaintiff’s state law claims when she opted- in to the collective action. Id . at *12. Therefore, in the interest of judicial efficiency and fairness, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s action with prejudice. Harrington, et al. v. AT&T Services , 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90008 (W.D. Tex. May 11, 2021). Plaintiff, a call- center employee, filed a collective action alleging that Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked in violation of the FLSA. Plaintiff was a former opt-in Plaintiff in a decertified collective action captioned Mosley-Lovings v. AT&T Corp. , Case No. 18-CV-1145 (N.D. Tex.). After the Court decertified the collective action in the Mosley- Lovings suit, Plaintiff and eight other former Mosley-Lovings opt-in Plaintiffs filed suit against the same AT&T Defendants (Harrington #1). Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in Harrington #1, but their counsel did not appear at the hearing for the motion. The Court struck the motion for leave to amend as a sanction for Plaintiffs’ failure to appear at the hearing and stated that any subsequent attempt to amend would be governed by the more-stringent "good cause" standard under Rule 16. The Court also held that any amendment was futile based upon Harrington #1 and Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust applicable grievance and arbitration procedures. Plaintiff thereafter filed an action alleging substantially similar FLSA violations against Defendants. In turn, Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) under the "claim-splitting" doctrine on the basis that the lawsuit involved the same parties and same causes of action, and was based upon the same facts as Harrington #1. The Court granted the motion. The Court explained that the rule against claim splitting applies when two lawsuits are based on the same nucleus of operative facts. The Court reasoned that the action was filed by Cedric Harrington, a Plaintiff in Harrington #1, and was filed by the same attorneys against the same Defendants as those in Harrington #1, and asserted virtually identical FLSA claims. For these reasons, the Court held that Plaintiff’s claims arose out of the same nucleus of operative facts and share a