18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition 299 dismiss, contending that because of a previous settlement of an action alleging similar claims in Petrone, et al. v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. , Case No. 11-CV-401, Plaintiff’s lawsuit should be dismissed. Defendants argued that Plaintiff should be barred from bringing her claims under the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff contended that she was not a member of the class in the Petrone class and collective actions, and therefore claim and issue preclusion would not bar her claims. Defendants asserted that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by issue and claim preclusion because she was in privity with and adequately represented by the Petrone Plaintiffs. The Court disagreed with Defendants. First, the Court noted that it was well established that for a class action lawsuit for money damages to bind an absent class member, he or she "must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation." Id . at *9. The Court opined that because Plaintiff did not work for Defendants prior to the Petrone settlement, she would not have been provided notice of the prior suit, and she could not have been a potential member of the class. The Court reasoned that even if Plaintiff had qualified at the time the Petrone lawsuit was pending to be a member of the class, she would have had the right to request exclusion from the class after receiving notice of it while retaining her right to litigate her own claims at a later date. Id . at *10. For these reasons, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (xxxiii) Sleep-Time Policies In Wage & Hour Class Action Litigation Wagner, et al. v. Air Methods Corp., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92857 (D. Colo. May 17, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of flight paramedics and nurses who worked in Michigan, New Mexico, and Illinois, brought a wage & hour class action alleging overtime violations pursuant to their respective state’s labor laws. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, and the Court granted and denied in part the parties’ motions. The primary issue on summary judgment was whether the FLSA’s “sleep time” rule applied in Illinois, New Mexico, and Michigan. Under the FLSA’s “sleep time” rule, time provided to employees for sleeping during 24-hour shifts is excluded from an employee’s hours worked, for overtime purposes, so long as the employee is able to get at least five hours of uninterrupted rest. Thus, as applied in this case where Plaintiffs brought their claims pursuant to state law and not the FLSA, if the “sleep time” rule did not apply in a given state, Plaintiffs from that state were owed additional compensation for overtime in yet-to-be-determined amounts. Accordingly, the Court considered whether Illinois, New Mexico, and Michigan had adopted the “sleep time” rule. As to the Illinois claims, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the basis that Illinois had not adopted the “sleep time” rule. In so ruling the Court rejected Defendant’s assertion that Illinois case law authorities had found that the FLSA can be used to interpret the Illinois Minimum Wage Law ("IMWL"), and that numerous cases suggested that the sleep time rule applies. After reviewing the IMWL and the relevant judicial decisions, the Court sided with Plaintiffs on this issue. It determined that the “sleep time” rule was notably absent from Illinois regulations defining hours worked, whereas the same regulations had expressly included two other exceptions that paralleled the FLSA’s exceptions for meal periods and travel time. However, the Court concluded that New Mexico had adopted the “sleep time” rule and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on those claims. The Court opined that in New Mexico the minimum wage law was intended to be interpreted consistently with the FLSA, and pointed out that the “sleep time” rule had been expressly incorporated into a manual issued by the state’s labor agency. As to the Michigan claims, the Court noted that there was a “wrinkle” in the Michigan minimum wage law that neither side had fully addressed. The Court observed that Michigan’s minimum wage statute, the Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage Act ("MWOWA"), provides for overtime compensation of one and one-half times the regular rate of employee pay. However, unlike the Illinois and New Mexico laws, the MWOWA has a provision on employer exceptions that expressly interacts with the FLSA. Specifically, § 408.420 states that MWOWA does not apply to an employer that is subject to the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA, unless those federal minimum wage provisions would result in a lower minimum hourly wage than provided in the MWOWA. Because the federal minimum wage was currently lower than Michigan’s minimum wage, and it had been for the entire class period at issue, the Court concluded that Defendant was not subject to Michigan’s overtime rule. Accordingly, the Court ruled that to the extent that Michigan-based Plaintiffs sought compensation for unpaid overtime in Michigan, they must do so under the FLSA. Accordingly the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the Michigan Plaintiffs’ claims. In sum, the Court granted in part and denied in part the parties’ motions for summary judgment.