18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

378 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition non-appealable order, the death knell doctrine did not apply where PAGA claims remained in the trial court. In November of 2018, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application for an order determining the date by which the case must be brought to trial. The same day, Defendant filed a motion in limine t o dismiss the case for failure to bring it to trial within five years. The trial court found that with the exception of an initial stay from April 9, 2013 until August 23, 2013, no other time periods were excludable from the five-year calculation. The trial court reasoned that the action was not stayed during the pendency of Plaintiffs’ appeal because an appeal from a non- appealable order does not automatically stay the trial court proceedings, and there were no other time periods when it was impossible or impracticable to bring the action to trial. It therefore concluded the five-year clock expired on August 23, 2018. Because the case was not brought to trial before that date, nor did Plaintiffs request that a trial be set before that date, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendant. Plaintiffs appealed and challenged the judgment as well as denial of their class certification motion. Plaintiffs argued on appeal that the trial court erred by dismissing their action for failure to bring it to trial within five years because the trial court should have excluded certain time from the five-year period, including the 118 days during which their appeal was pending because the appeal effected an automatic stay and, alternatively, prosecution of the case was impossible or impracticable during that period. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Plaintiffs. It held based upon the record before it, the trial court properly dismissed the class action for failure to bring it to trial within five years, as required by § 583.310. Because this conclusion was dispositive, the Court of Appeal did not address whether the trial court erred in denying class certification. As such the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Willis, et al. v. Los Angeles County Waterworks District No. 40, Appeal No. 082766 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. May 26, 2021). Plaintiffs were a group of non-governmental landowners that were a class of litigants in the Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases (“AVGC”). Plaintiffs brought a class action against Defendant seeking to protect their future rights to pump groundwater from a basin that spanned more than 1,000 miles across parts of southeastern Kern County and northeastern Los Angeles County. After Plaintiffs settled their class action with Defendant in 2011, Plaintiffs sought over $2.2 million in attorneys’ fees from Defendant for work performed in the AVGC from January 1, 2012, through December 31, 2015. However, in the settlement agreement, Plaintiffs had agreed to not seek any attorneys’ fees from Defendant after judgment was entered on the settlement agreement except under certain circumstances. Based upon the parties’ agreement that provided that Plaintiffs would not seek post-settlement fees except under certain circumstances, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for fees. On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in denying the motion. Plaintiff argued that in its order the trial court misstated the settlement provisions. As such, Plaintiffs argued that the trial court committed reversible error by applying “the wrong standards.” Id. at 6. Second, notwithstanding the settlement provisions, Plaintiffs argued that it was entitled to an award of fees and costs under § 1021.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeal found that the trial court’s misstatements in its order were harmless error because the decision not to award fees itself was correct. In looking to the express language of the settlement, the Court of Appeal determined that Plaintiffs were bound by the agreement to not seek post-settlement attorneys’ fees and costs except under certain express conditions. Further, the Court of Appeal held that none of express conditions were established in this case. Because the settlement agreement precluded an award of attorneys’ fees, the Court of Appeal found that it was unnecessary to consider whether Plaintiffs could have satisfied the requirements of § 1021.5. For these reasons, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court properly denied Plaintiffs’ motion for fees, and therefore it affirmed the trial court’s order. Wilson-Davis, et al. v. SSP America, Inc., 2021 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1572 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. March 11, 2021). Plaintiff, a dishwasher, filed a class action asserting a number of wage & hour violations against Defendant under California Labor Code. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant failed to: (i) pay minimum wages; (ii) pay overtime wages; (iii) provide meal breaks; (iv) provide rest breaks; (v) reimburse business expenses; (vi) provide accurate wage statements; and (vii) pay all wages due upon separation of employment. Id. at *5. Plaintiff was also a union member represented by Unite Here Local 11 (“the Union”), and in 2018, the Union and Defendant entered into a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) covering Plaintiff and other employees of Defendant. The CBA provided for a two-step internal grievance resolution process, and if this process did not resolve the grievance, claims could be submitted for non-binding mediation. Separately, Article 11 of the CBA stated that, if the internal grievance process did not settle the grievance, “the Union or the Employer may submit the issue, in writing, to final and binding arbitration.” Id. at *4. In light of this language