18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

412 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition (ii) Florida B.J. ’ s Wholesale Club, Inc. v. Bugliaro, et al., 2021 Fla. App. LEXIS 5255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. April 14, 2021). Plaintiff brought a class action challenging the method to determine the taxable sales price of products sold to consumers with discounts funded in part by the merchant and in part by the manufacturer. The case stemmed from a nuance in Florida state sales tax law regarding how to calculate the taxable sales price when a product was discounted. In some circumstances, the discount was funded entirely by the merchant, in which case the taxable sales price was the discounted price paid by the consumer. In other circumstances, however, the discount was funded by the manufacturer, so that the merchant was reimbursed for the full discount, in which case the taxable sales price was the undiscounted amount. In other cases, the discount was funded in part by the merchant and in part by the manufacturer, known as a "split-funded" discount, which was the type of discount involved in this case. Id. at *3. Plaintiff brought her challenge as a claim against Defendant to enjoin an unfair trade practice under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”). Both Defendant and the Florida Department of Revenue intervened and argued that such a challenge must be brought instead against the State under the various administrative and legal avenues established by the Legislature for taxpayers to challenge the collection of sales taxes. Plaintiff moved to certify an injunctive relief Rule 23(b)(2) class under Rule 1.220 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. After the trial court certified the class, Defendant and the State of Florida appealed to the Florida District Court of Appeal. The District Court of Appeal held that an injunctive class should be certified only where an injunction was an available remedy. The District Court of Appeal concluded that in these circumstances, Plaintiff was a taxpayer who did not have a cause of action against Defendant for an injunction against an unfair trade practice. The District Court of Appeal reasoned that the Legislature’s creation of extensive remedies for improper sales tax collections, with limits on those remedies, indicated the Legislature did not intend normal and routine tax disputes to be resolved in lawsuits under FDUTPA against a merchant. The District Court of Appeal determined that the structure of the law was clearly intended to ensure a consistent, statewide application of the tax laws to all taxpayers across the State. It was also expressly intended to avoid the problem of merchants being caught in the middle of inconsistent demands from consumers and the Department. In this regime of law, it was clearly the intent of the Legislature that routine challenges to the collection and remittance of sales taxes be brought against the State. Where Defendant collected and remitted sales taxes to the State in apparent good faith reliance on the tax laws without any improper attempt to obtain a competitive advantage, Florida law provided that the taxpayer must seek its remedy against the State and leave the merchant out of the middle of its tax dispute. Accordingly, because the remedy of an injunction under FDUTPA against Defendant was not available to a taxpayer like Plaintiff in a tax dispute under these circumstances, the District Court of Appeal held that it was reversible error for the trial court to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class for the purposes of obtaining this unavailable remedy. For these reasons, the District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order certifying an injunctive relief class. Cuccaro, et al. v. DeSantis, Case No. 2021-CA-1413 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 30, 2021). Plaintiffs filed a class action and a motion seeking a declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus finding that Defendants, the Governor of Florida and various state officials, violated the Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (“FPUC”) by opting-out of the program with funds still available for distribution to Florida citizens in violation of § 443 of the Florida Statutes. Plaintiffs were unemployed individuals receiving FPUC benefits of $600 per week. Congress set the benefit to expire, after which it was reinstated, with a reduced weekly payment of $300. Defendants opted-out of participation with the FPUC in May of 2021. Section 433.031 instructs Florida to “promote employment security, the reemployment of unemployed persons, and to both collect and distribute compensation to unemployed individuals.” Id . at 8. The section also defined the term “reemployment assistance” as “cash benefits payable to individuals with respect to the unemployment” and that any “reference to reemployment assistance shall mean compensation payable from an unemployment fund…” Id . at 9. The Court determined that the FPUC was not a state-funded unemployment fund, as it was used to pay benefits appropriated from the federal Treasury. As a result, the Court ruled that the FPUC failed to meet the Florida Legislature’s narrow definition of “reemployment assistance.” Id . The Court therefore held that Defendants did not violate § 433 by opting-out of the FPUC. For these reasons, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary injunction. Rojas, et al. v. The University Of Florida Board Of Trustees, Case No. 2021-CA-1124 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 18, 2021). Plaintiff, a former university student, filed a class action alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment