18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition 413 in connection with Defendant’s failure to provide tuition and fees refunds after it closed its campuses in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, and the Court granted in part and denied in part the motion. Defendant argued that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant breached an express, written agreement concerning fees that he paid when he registered for courses at the university. Attached to his complaint, Plaintiff submitted invoices showing the fees, tuition, and fee schedule, which itemized the fees to the specific services provided. Plaintiff also submitted a “Financial Liability Agreement,” which he alleged was a contract between the parties. Id. at 3. The Court ruled that Plaintiff adequately supported his allegations with documentation sufficiently definite to constitute an express contract. The Court therefore concluded that at this early stage in the litigation, Plaintiff adequately plead the existence of an express contract between himself and the university pursuant to which Plaintiff agreed to pay fees in exchange for specific services to be provided by the university during the Spring and Summer 2020 semesters. The Court determined that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged an express contract to overcome the defense of sovereign immunity. However, as to Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim, the Court ruled that that it was barred by sovereign immunity as it asserted the same claim as the breach of contract claim that was pled in the alternative. For these reasons, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Verdini, et al. v. District Board Of Trustees Of Miami-Dade College, 2021 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 1, 2021). Plaintiff, a university student, filed a class action alleging breach of express contract following Defendant’s refusal to refund certain fees imposed for on-campus services after the university moved to online distance learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court denied. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant breached an express, written agreement with him concerning fees that he was required to pay for the Summer 2020 semester, and he submitted invoices to the Court that listed the specific purpose of each fee. Plaintiff alleged that the documents constituted an express, written agreement between the parties to provide specific services authorized by the Florida statutes in exchange for the payment of fees. Id . at *2. Defendant argued that Plaintiff failed to identify the on-campus services or the express written terms that it breached by not providing the services. Id . The Court held that the documents, along with Plaintiff’s complaint, sufficiently contained the express written terms and provided the specific services Defendant was contractually obligated to provide in exchange for Plaintiff’s payment of "fees" to survive a motion to dismiss. Id . Defendant further argued that sovereign immunity barred Plaintiff’s claims. However, the Court explained that under Florida law, where there is an express written contract, "the defense of sovereign immunity does not protect the state agency from an action arising out of a breach of either an express or implied covenant or condition of that contract." Id . at *3. The Court therefore held that Plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of action for breach of an express contract, and it denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (iii) Georgia Love, et al. v. Fulton County Board Of Tax Assessors, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 294 (Ga. June 1, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of taxpayers, filed a class action against Defendants, Fulton County Board of Tax Assessors (the “Board”) and certain Board members, asserting that Defendants had not been diligent in determining that the Atlanta Falcons Stadium Company LLC (“StadCo”), had an interest in the Mercedes-Benz Stadium that was not subject to ad valorem taxation. Plaintiffs sought mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief, and a refund of taxes paid. Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants had committed a gross abuse of discretion by failing to find that StadCo had a leasehold interest in the stadium that is subject to ad valorem taxation. Plaintiffs also asserted that Defendants decision was based on an “unconstitutionally adopted” exemption codified in OCGA § 10-9-10. Defendants asserted that they had properly determined that StadCo’s interest was a non-taxable usufruct after conducting an investigation and holding a hearing at which they considered evidence concerning the nature of StadCo’s interest. They also argued that the Board’s decision was not based on OCGA § 10-9-10, but rather on an evaluation of agreements entered into between the intervenors prior to the construction of the stadium. In its order dismissing the case, the trial court addressed each of Plaintiffs’ claims and found that Plaintiffs’ petition lacked any legal basis for recovery. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, Plaintiffs maintained that the trial court erred in dismissing their petition, allegedly s ua sponte , primarily because the trial court had applied an incorrect standard of review. They also contended that the trial court erred in declining to find OCGA § 10-9-10 unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the judgment of the trial court. First, the Supreme Court held that, with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants had not been diligent in determining that the stadium company had a usufruct interest in the new football stadium that was not subject to ad valorem taxation,