18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition 417 by over $1 billion. Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, and the Court granted the motion. Plaintiffs were members of the CME and CBOT and were comprised primarily of traders who owned the two exchanges prior to the demutualization in 2000, when the company transferred to a for-profit stock corporation rather than private not for-profit membership. Subsequently, CME opened a large data center that housed the exchanges’ main electronic trading platforms. Plaintiffs asserted that CME breached contractual obligations by making membership changes without an affirmative vote by members and by modifying the ways in which members could obtain access to the trading platform. Plaintiffs sought certification of a class consisting of two classes, including: (i) all current owners of CME class B shares, with subclasses in various manners; and (ii) all current owners of CBOT class B memberships, with subclasses in various manners. According to Plaintiffs, each subclass would have between 74 and 1,402 members and thus both classes were sufficiently numerous. The Court also determined that that common questions were present for each class. The Court reasoned that as to CME class members, their claims were rooted in CMEG’s agreement to protect the trading floor access rights and privileges granted to each series of class B stock, including the commitment to floor trading. Id . at 4. As to the CBOT class members, the Court found that their claims were rooted in their own charter and series trading rights, which gave each holder of class B memberships “all trading rights and privileges” with respect to those they were entitled to trade on the open exchange or electronic trading system. Id . The Court also found that Plaintiffs and their counsel would adequately represent the classes. The Court concluded that Plaintiffs claimed that their cause of action stemmed from Defendants’ breaches of core rights and privileges set forth in the CME and CBOT charters, thereby resulting in common liability and damages for all members. Id . at 8. Plaintiffs further contended that class certification would obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent rulings. Id . The Court agreed. It found that a class action would best secure the economies of time, effort, and expense, and avoid the potential of inconsistent rulings. Id . at 8-9. For these reasons, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Rodriguez, et al. v. Returns ‘ R ’ Us Inc., Case No. 2-21-684 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. Dec. 14, 2021) . Plaintiffs, a group of employees, filed a class action alleging that Defendant violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”). Defendant previously had moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ claim was preempted by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act (“IWCA”). Thereafter, Defendant moved to stay the action pending the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling in McDonald v. Symphony Bronzeville Park, LLC , Case No. 126511, in which the Supreme Court would determine whether the IWCA preempts the same BIPA violation alleged in Plaintiffs’ action. Plaintiffs did not filed an opposition to the motion to stay the action. The trial court denied the motion to stay, and on appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s ruling. Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by denying its unopposed motion to stay. The Appellate Court agreed. It determined that it has long recognized that a stay is appropriate when there is a case pending before a court of review that could have dispositive effect on the trial court proceedings. Id . at 4. The Appellate Court explained that here, the preemption question before the Supreme Court in McDonald likely would have a dispositive effect on Defendant’s motion to dismiss in this matter. The Appellate Court reasoned that to order the parties to litigate a motion to dismiss and motion for class certification, and engage in discovery when the McDonald decision may be fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims, would require all parties to expend significant time and resources. Id . at 5. The Appellate Court further opined that a stay would not unduly burden the parties. Accordingly, the Appellate Court ruled that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to stay, and reversed and remanded the trial court’s ruling. Ruble, et al. v. Tate-Nadeau, Case No. 4-20-641 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. Dec. 28, 2021) . Plaintiffs, a group of restaurants and taverns, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus alleging that they were owed compensation in connection with the executive order of the Governor of Illinois that closed dine-in restaurants and taverns due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and on appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. Plaintiffs argued that the executive orders effectively constituted a taking of their personal property under the meaning of the Illinois Emergency Management Act (“Act”) and under the terms of the Act, they were owed just compensation for that taking. Plaintiffs did not contend that the Governor acted outside of his authority under the Act; instead, they asserted that it constituted a taking of their property by not allowing them on the restaurant premises, which meant that they should be compensated. The trial court determined that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim that Defendants’ actions constituted a taking such that compensation was warranted to entitle them to mandamus relief. The Appellate Court agreed. It ruled that under