18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

432 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition corporation with its main offices in Lehigh County; (ii) it did not maintain offices or manufacturing facilities in Philadelphia County; (iii) none of its sales representatives maintained home offices in Philadelphia County; (iv) none of its employees were residents of Philadelphia County; (iv) from January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2018, total sales of its products to end users in Philadelphia County represented less than 1% of its overall sales; and (v) from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019, Defendant’s total sales of its products to end users in Philadelphia County represented less than 1% of its overall sales. Id . at *3. Plaintiff argued that Defendant engaged in Philadelphia County in sufficient quantity, quality, and regularity by selling its products to hospitals and other healthcare providers over several years. The trial court found the quantity of Defendant’s contacts within Philadelphia County were insufficient to establish venue because the sales in Philadelphia accounted for less than 1% of its sales for the past three years, there was no other sufficient contact to tie Defendant there, no office was located there, the corporate headquarters was located in Lehigh County, and the medical device manufacturing facility that was the alleged source of the claimed emissions of ethylene oxide was also in Lehigh County. Accordingly, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling finding the quantity of Defendant’s contacts with Philadelphia County was insufficient to establish venue. Askin, et al. v. School District Of Pittsburgh Department Of Education, 2021 Penn. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 591 (Penn. Commw. Nov. 19, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of tenured Assistant Principals employed by the School District of Pittsburgh (“District”), filed petition for review of the Secretary of Education’s (“Secretary”) order concluding that the Assistant Principals had not been demoted under § 1151 of the Public School Code of 1949 (“School Code”). The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the ruling. Plaintiffs asserted that after the Board approval a new five-step compensation plan, any Assistant Principals hired or promoted after April 1, 2018 were on the new salary schedule; and all Assistant Principals hired or promoted prior to April 1, 2018, remained on the old salary schedule. The Board also changed the Assistant Principals’ work year, moving them from the 10-month teacher work year of 208 days to the 12-month principal work year of 250 days, but provided an additional 25 annual vacation days. After a hearing on the new compensation plan, the Board’s Hearing Officer determined that the Assistant Principals did not suffer a "salary demotion" under § 1151 of the School Code and adopted the new compensation plan. Id . at *5. Plaintiffs contended that, in effect, they were demoted based on the Board’s decision by increasing the number of their workdays that eliminated their ability to perform summer or additional work, by freezing their salaries at the current level, and by reducing their per diem rate of pay both currently and into the future due to decreased severance pay for unused sick and vacation days. Id . at *5-6. The Court concluded that because the Plaintiffs’ minimum salary exceeded that provided by § 1142, the District was free to increase their salary by other means, which it did by increasing the step based on performance, providing a 2% across-the-board retroactive salary increase, and adding 25 vacation days. For these reasons, the Court affirmed the Secretary’s decision. Corman, III, et al. v. Acting Secretary Of The Pennsylvania Department Of Health, Case No. 294 M.D. 2021 (Penn. Commw. Nov. 16, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of minor children, filed a motion seeking a preliminary injunction declaring Defendant’s mask mandate void. Defendant filed a motion to stay the action pending the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court’s ruling on whether Defendant acted properly in issuing the masking order in the absence of either legislative oversight or a declaration of disaster issued by the Governor. Following the ruling which found that Defendant’s masking order was void ab initio because it was a regulation not duly promulgated in accordance with state law, Defendant appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The appeal triggered an automatic stay in the Commonwealth Court. Plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion seeking termination of the automatic stay. The Court granted the motion. The Court explained that in order to prevail on a motion to vacate an automatic supersedeas, the petition must establish: (i) that they were likely to prevail on the merits; and (ii) that without the requested relief they would suffer irreparable injury; and (iii) the removal of the supersedes would not substantially harm other interested parties or adversely affect the public interest. Id . at 4. The Court determined that Plaintiffs were likely to achieve success on the merits because it already had determined that the mask order was void ab initio because Defendant failed to follow proper state law requirements. Second, the Court reasoned that allowing an order to remain in force during the pendency of an appeal, which already declared to be void, and that affected the lives and behavior of all citizens, would irreparably harm all citizens. Finally, the Court found that lifting the stay would not substantially harm other interested parties or adversely affect the public interest. Id . at 7. For these reasons, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to lift the automatic stay.