18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition 467 time and resources it spent representing the classes since this case began in 2012." Id . The Court granted class counsel’s motion and denied the lead Plaintiff’s motion. Class counsel presented a lodestar amount based on blended historic hourly rates for $10,065,697.10. In addition, they provided the Court with supporting information, including: (i) each timekeeper’s hours, tasks, and current and blended hourly rates; (ii) the categories of work for which compensation was sought; (iii) biographical information for the lawyers for whom compensation was sought; and (iv) additional facts supporting the reasonableness of the hourly rates, including market rates for similar professionals. Id . at *4. In analyzing the hours works, the Court removed any entries for support staff. The Court found that the hourly rates for the attorneys and staff attorneys were appropriate, but that the hourly rates for the paralegals, litigation support personnel, law clerks, and project attorneys were not, and thus it adjusted the rates for those timekeepers. Finally, the Court noted that some of the hours were excessive, and it employed a 10% across the board reduction of the lodestar. Applying all of these reductions, the Court ruled that the revised aggregate lodestar was $7,811,276.85. The Court determined that at multiplier of 2.5 was reasonable, and when applied to the revised aggregate lodestar, the attorneys’ fee award equaled $19,528,192.10. Id . at *12. The Court also awarded reimbursement for $1,856.169.03 in expenses. Id . at *13 Finally, the Court rejected the lead Plaintiff’s request for an award $10,880 on the grounds that it was unnecessary. Frew, et al. v. Young , 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 8932 (5th Cir. March 26, 2021). In 2007, the parties agreed to 11 corrective-action orders ("CAOs") that would bring Texas into compliance with a class action consent decree to make improvements to Texas’s implementation of Medicaid’s Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment program. Id . at *2. The "Check Up Reports and Plans for Lagging Counties" CAOs required the state to gather data by county regarding its provision of Medicaid services, develop plans for increasing participation in counties that were behind others, and included four-year check-in periods to determine next steps, if any. Id . at *3. At the conclusion of the check-in period, the parties had several remaining disputes, and filed cross- motions regarding the continuation of the CAOs. The District Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion and granted Defendants’ motion. Subsequently, the parties disagreed of the award of attorneys’ fees due Plaintiffs’ counsel. The parties negotiated over the fees owed to Plaintiffs’ counsel, and when they could not come to a conclusion, the District Court determined that even though Plaintiffs "were ultimately unsuccessful on their motions related" to the Lagging Counties CAO, Defendants were required to pay for a fee award to Plaintiffs’ counsel as Plaintiffs were the prevailing party as to the issuance of the original consent decrees. On Defendant’s appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the District Court’s ruling because "prevailing party status does not automatically entitle a party to the full amount of attorneys’ fees incurred." Id . at *5. On remand, the District Court denied any attorneys’ fee award. Plaintiffs thereafter appealed again, and the Fifth Circuit found that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the appeal because it was filed outside of the applicable 30-day appeal window. Therefore, because the motion was untimely, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the order for want of appellate jurisdiction. Grace, et al. v. Apple, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66294 (N.D. Cal. March 31, 2021). Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging trespass to chattels claims against Defendant in connection with its FaceTime application. The parties subsequently settled the matter and the Court granted final settlement approval. Class counsel thereafter filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Court granted the motion in part. Class counsel sought attorneys’ fees of 30% of the settlement fund. The Court held that 30% was not warranted, but that the significant risks assumed by class counsel supported a moderate upward adjustment from the 25% benchmark recognized in the Ninth Circuit. Further, the Court reasoned that class counsel achieved a significant monetary result of $18 million, or 20% of the total average damages initially estimated by Plaintiffs’ expert. Id . at *10. Accordingly, the Court concluded that a percentage of 28% should be applied to the $18 million settlement fund. The Court noted that the lodestar cross-check was 8,068,130, or 0.67 times the requested award of $5.4 million. The Court excluded non-working travel, block-billing, and excessive hours from the lodestar for a revised lodestar figure of $7,474,381, which constituted a negative multiplier of 0.72 on the requested fee award of 30% of the settlement fund, which confirmed the Court’s calculation of a 28% award using the percentage-of-the-fund method. Accordingly, the Court awarded class counsel 28% of the settlement fund, or $5.04 million. Having reviewed the expense submissions of class counsel, the Court found that their requests for unreimbursed expenses were reasonable, and granted an award of $1,083,045.14 in unreimbursed costs be paid from the settlement fund to class counsel. Finally, the Court noted the extensive contributions of the class representatives, and thereby awarded service awards of $7,500 to each of them.