18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition 481 policy specifically provided that strip searches should be conducted in private and thus each class members’ claim would need to be individually addressed. As such, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the class failed to meet commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). The Sixth Circuit also determined that it was not enough to show generically that Defendant had a policy of acting with deliberate indifference toward these types of unconstitutional strip searches, but that each class member also would have to show that the class member was herself subjected to a "constitutional deprivation" in the way that she was searched. Id . at *18. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that one Plaintiff’s success in proving that acquiescence in the violation of Defendant’s policies was a moving force behind her unconstitutional search would not establish the claims of the rest of the class members. For these reasons, the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court’s class certification order. Zelaya, et al. v. Hammer, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25119 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 31, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of Latino meat-processing plant workers, brought a class action against a group of federal and state law enforcement officials alleging violations of their civil rights. Plaintiffs alleged that they were detained at work by law enforcement officers during an immigration raid, physically restrained, had guns pointed at them, were verbally and physically abused, and transferred to a nearby facility for interrogation and fingerprinting, while white co- workers were not. Plaintiffs asserted violations of their rights under the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment’s equal-protection clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1986, and various sections of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court granted in part and denied in part. The Court denied Plaintiffs’ claim under the Fifth Amendment’s equal-protection claim, finding that the context of race-based claims differ from the remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents , 403 U.S. 388 (1971, which Plaintiffs cited in support of their claims . Similarly, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims for unreasonable search and seizure on the basis that the immigration- related nature of the raid gave the Defendants’ actions a “meaningfully different” context that was separate from claim under Bivens . Id. at *35. The Court disagreed with Defendants that § 1985(3) does not apply to federal officers; instead, it found that it did not grant them qualified immunity because when state and federal law enforcement agents jointly targeted Plaintiffs on the basis of their race they conspired to perpetuate a violation of the equal protection of the law under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The Court found a similar violation for the 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim. The Court also declined to dismiss the individual claims of excessive force after concluding that the accused individual Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity in the application of force, as his actions were not pursuant to legitimate law enforcement goals, nor were the actions of the individual Plaintiffs immediately threatening enough to warrant use of such force. The Court additionally sided with Plaintiffs, since they were falsely arrested and imprisoned in violation of FTCA, and disagreed with Defendants’ assertion that undocumented individuals do not have a right not to be detained. For these reasons, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (xiii) Class Action Litigation Involving Universities Abuelhawa, et al. v. Santa Clara University , 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61263 (N.D. Cal. March 29, 2021) . Plaintiffs, a group of law school students, filed a class action alleging breach of contract and violation of the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) in connection with Defendant’s alleged promise to provide in-person instruction, which it failed to provide after moving courses online due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court granted. Plaintiffs contended that they "paid Defendant for in-person classes and the availability of on-campus facilities and experiences, and did not receive what they paid for." Id . at *4. Plaintiffs asserted that Defendant’s course materials, student bulletins, and website provided evidence that Defendant promised to provide in-person instruction by: (i) distinguishing between in-person and online instruction; (ii) stating that classes would be "at the law school" and that teachers "may utilize class attendance" in grading; and (iii) listing on the website Defendant’s faculty, libraries, and campus life. Plaintiffs alleged that these statements constituted Defendant’s promises to either (i) hold in-person instruction despite the COVID-19 pandemic; or (ii) to refund Plaintiffs’ tuition. Id . at *5-6. Defendant contended that it also had a financial agreements to which Plaintiffs assented, stating that the "tuition refund schedule" governed refunds, and which held students responsible for tuition for courses. Id . at *8. Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim on two grounds, including: (i) Plaintiffs inadequately pled a specific promise; and (ii) even if Plaintiffs pled a specific promise, Plaintiffs’ implied contract claim was barred by financial disclaimers in Defendant’s tuition refund schedule and student bulletins. Id . at *10-11. The Court agreed with the first ground for dismissal, and therefore did not address the second. The Court determined that none of the statements on