18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition 511 internship. On his application, Plaintiff noted that he was authorized to work in the United States and was a citizen of Mexico. Plaintiff answered that he would not need future company sponsorship for a visa or work authorization. Plaintiff also mistakenly noted that his work authorization was permanent and not temporary. Plaintiff received an offer for 2019 summer internship. Defendant noted that the internship offer was “contingent upon the verified, satisfactory completion of requirements outlined in the Conditions of Employment." Id . at *4. As part of the conditions of employment, Plaintiff was asked to provide a document establishing that an intern was a U.S. Citizen or National, Permanent Resident, Temporary Resident, or Refugee. Plaintiff marked that he was legally authorized to work, he was a citizen of Mexico, and he would not need future company sponsorship for a visa or work authorization. However, when required to input the information necessary to obtain the required Transportation Worker Identification Credential (“TWIC”) card to enter Defendant’s facility, Plaintiff realized that his employment authorization document did not present itself as a valid option for TWIC eligibility. Defendant’s Human Resources representative instructed Plaintiff to change his response to the question "Do you now or will you in the future require company sponsorship for a visa or employment authorization?" from "No" to "Yes." Id . at *6. After making this change, Plaintiff resubmitted his application. Thereafter, Plaintiff received a call from a Human Resources representative informing him that Defendant was rescinding its internship offer. Plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to discrimination on the basis of his alienage by Defendant’s policy that denied employment to individuals who have temporary work authorization, “including those who have acquired work authorization through the DACA policy." Id . at *15. The Court explained that Congress enacted the Unfair Immigration-Related Employment Practices section of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 that excluded from its protection against alienage discrimination those aliens who hold temporary visas or other non-permanent work authorizations, such as Plaintiff. Id . at *16. The Court thus reasoned that to construe § 1981 as protecting all aliens in the United States would read the Unfair Immigration- Related Employment Practices section of the IRCA out of existence. The Court held that Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant rescinded the offer after it learned that Plaintiff possessed temporary work authorization was not sufficient to state a claim for discrimination. Accordingly, the Court ruled that Plaintiff failed state a plausible claim for alienage discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and it granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Williams, et al. v. Tech Mahindra (Americas), Inc. , 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17727 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2021). Plaintiff, a former director of business development, filed a class action alleging that Defendant discriminated against non-South Asian employees in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Specifically, Defendant placed Plaintiff on a performance improvement plan (“PIP”) due to unsatisfactory sales numbers, and subsequently fired Plaintiff after he did not meet the goals set forth in the PIP. According to Plaintiff, Defendant refused to help him overcome issues concerning Defendant’s poor business relationships with local clients and established unreasonable revenue goals in his PIP on the basis of Plaintiff’s race (Caucasian). Seeking to represent a putative class on the same basis, Plaintiff further alleged that Defendant gave preferential treatment to South Asian employees in terms of both workplace conduct and promotional decisions, and that Defendant terminated non-South Asian employees at a disproportionately high rate. Id. at *2-3. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff’s claims failed because: (i) Plaintiff lacked Article III standing to pursue a claim for hiring discrimination; (ii) the complaint was time-barred; and (iii) the complaint lacked sufficient factual allegations to support a § 1981 claim. Id. at *8. The Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss in its entirety. With respect to Article III standing, the Court opined that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that he suffered an injury-in-fact that was fairly traceable to Defendant’s conduct, i.e. , Plaintiff referenced his placement on a PIP, the requirement to meet unreasonable sales goals, and his eventual termination. Regarding Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s claims were time-barred, Plaintiff contended that the applicable statute of limitations was tolled while Plaintiffs in a separate race discrimination class action against Defendant amended their complaint to add Plaintiff as a class representative. Id. at *13. The Court determined that Plaintiff was entitled to tolling under American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah , 414 U.S. 538 (1974), for purposes of his individual claim, but it also held that American Pipe tolling did not apply to successive class actions. Id. at *16-17. Thus, the Court granted Defendant’s motion with respect to Plaintiff’s class action claim. Finally, Defendant averred that Plaintiff offered mere conclusory accusations concerning Defendant’s allegedly discriminatory conduct, thereby failing to state a valid cause of action under § 1981. The Court agreed. It found that Plaintiff’s “boilerplate assertions unsupported by specific facts” were insufficient to meet the “but-for” showing required for § 1981 claims. Id. at *20-21. Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss.