18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

516 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition and costs). The parties further agreed that class counsel could file a motion requesting attorneys’ fees in the maximum amount of 33.33% of the total fund and $702.60 in costs, and that the settlement administrator would receive $17,755 to be paid from the common fund. Id . at *5. The Court determined that Plaintiffs had Article III standing, and the settlement class met all requirement of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The Court further concluded that all factors weighed in favor of a finding that the proposed settlement was fair, reasonable, and not the product of any collusion. Id . at *22. As to the likelihood of success at trial, the parties recognized that that there was no legal authority holding that the notice at issue was deficient and Defendant had raised numerous defenses, including a failure to mitigate damages or establish any prejudice. Thus, the Court opined that success at trial was not guaranteed. The Court also noted that the settlement resulted from good faith negotiations, among experienced class action lawyers, which had been facilitated by an experienced third-party private mediator. Id . at *27. Finally the Court ruled that given that the agreement was not contingent upon an award of any precise amount of attorneys’ fees, the 33.33% threshold did not weigh against a finding that the proposed settlement was fair and reasonable. For these reasons, the Court granted the parties’ joint motion for preliminary settlement approval. Smart-TD Local 161, et al. v. Wedriveu, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152274 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 12, 2021). Plaintiff, a labor union representing drivers, filed a class action alleging that Defendants violated the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act ("COBRA") by failing to provide former employees with an Election Notice within the required timeframe of 44 days of a qualifying event, and thereby denying the former employees their right to choose whether to continue insurance coverage. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and the Court denied the motion. Defendants argued that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring claims under the ERISA and the COBRA. Plaintiff contended that it had standing because its members were plan participants and it was in the best interest of judicial economy to proceed in this manner. Id . at *3. Plaintiff also asserted that it had Article III associational standing because its members had standing individually and no individual member’s participation would be necessary to establish Plaintiff’s claim. Id . The Court noted that under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), an ERISA claim may be brought by an ERISA plan participant, beneficiary, fiduciary, or the Secretary of Labor. The Court ruled that because Plaintiff, as a union, did not fall within one of the four exclusive categories of potential claimants set forth in the statute, Plaintiff lacked standing and was not plausibly entitled to relief under the statute. Id . at *8. The Court also disagreed with Plaintiff’s contention that it had Article III associational standing. The Court observed that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when "(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Id . at *9. Here, however, the Court reasoned that the request for relief included compensatory damages for the cost of expenses incurred by union members and beneficiaries, and would thus require the participation of individual members in the lawsuit, which precluded satisfaction of the third prong. For these reasons, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing. Torres, et al. v. Starbucks Corp., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47821 (M.D. Fla. March 15, 2021). Plaintiffs, two former employees who were married and who were participants in Defendant’s benefit plans, filed a class action alleging that Defendant violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), as amended by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"), by failing to provide Plaintiffs with a COBRA notice in compliance with the law. Plaintiffs contended that the notices failed to explain how to enroll in COBRA and were not accompanied by a physical election form; failed to provide the name, address, and telephone number of the party responsible under the plan for administration of continuation coverage benefits; failed to provide the name of the plan; and failed to provide the address to which payments should be sent. Id . at *3-4. Plaintiffs contended that they did not understand the enrollment notice and were unable to elect COBRA benefits due to these deficiencies. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiffs’ claims, and the Court granted the motion. Plaintiff Lubin left his employment with Defendant and joined his wife’s benefit plan. Plaintiff Torres did not object to arbitration of her claims, but Plaintiff Lubin asserted that he was not a party to the arbitration agreement because he was not the employee subject to the employment agreement. The Court concluded that Lubin was not a party to any arbitration agreement with Defendant. It explained that absent an agreement to arbitrate, the Court “cannot compel the parties to settle their dispute in an arbitral forum." Id . at *11. The Court also agreed with Lubin that he was not "suing Defendant based on any agreement, much less