18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition 517 his wife’s agreement with Defendant." Id. at *12. The complaint alleged that the COBRA notices were deficient and thereby caused Plaintiffs "economic injuries in the form of lost insurance, higher insurance premiums, and unpaid medical bills." Id. The Court ruled that the claims alleged in the complaint were grounded in the statutory right to be notified of the right to continued healthcare coverage, and not because of a violation of any contract. The Court also rejected Defendant’s argument that Lubin, as a third-party beneficiary, was bound to the terms of his wife’s arbitration agreement. The Court concluded that Defendant could not compel Lubin to arbitrate the claims on either equitable estoppel or as a third-party beneficiary grounds. For these reasons, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. Walker, et al. v. Sysco Corp. , Case No. 20-CV-2374 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 27, 2021). Plaintiff filed a class action alleging violation of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”) in connection with Defendant’s alleged failure to provide a timely COBRA notice that was compliant with applicable law. Defendant requested a copy of the COBRA notice from Plaintiff’s counsel. Defendant did not receive a copy. Thereafter Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, and Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff’s claim was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff subsequently withdrew her complaint. Defendant filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs associated with filing its motion to dismiss. The Court denied the motion. First, the Court explained that under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), it had discretion to award attorneys’ fees. However, the Court found an award was not appropriate pursuant to § 1132(g)(1) simply because it did not achieve some degree of success on the merits. In the alternative, Defendant contended that it was entitled to attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 because Plaintiff unreasonably filed an amended complaint when the claims were time-barred. Defendant asserted that Plaintiff’s counsel failed to conduct a basic pre-suit investigation, which led to Defendant incurring additional attorneys’ fees in responding to the lawsuit. The Court declined to award Defendant fees pursuant to § 1927 because it found that the actions of Plaintiff’s counsel fell short of the “abuse of judicial process” warranting sanctions. Id . at 7. For these reasons, the Court denied Defendant’s motion. (xxiv) Collateral Estoppel, Res Judicata , And Settlement Bar Concepts Under Rule 23 In Re Navistar Maxxforce Engines Marketing, 990 F.3d 1048 (7th Cir. 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of vehicle owners, filed a class action against Navistar that accused Defendant of selling trucks with defective engines. The parties settled the matter for $135 million, and the District Court granted preliminary settlement approval. Notice was disseminated to class members and the District Court held a final fairness hearing in which it addressed some objections to the class settlement. Thereafter, the District Court granted final settlement approval. Two class members (“Drasc”) in a parallel state law action sued Navistar in Ohio concerning the engines of Navistar’s trucks. The District Court declined to enjoin parallel suits in state court, and thus the Ohio case proceeded while the federal action was pending. After the District Court approved the settlement, however, Navistar’s lawyers notified Drasc’s counsel that its suit was barred by the release in the settlement and final judgment. Id . at 1050. Drasc argued it never received notice of the settlement and need to opt-out and that the effort to continue litigating in Ohio should be deemed a "reasonable indication" of a desire to opt-out. Id . The District Court permitted Drasc to intervene in order to present its argument for exclusion from the class. The District Court noted that the evidence established: (i) two letters regarding the settlement had been sent to Drasc at its business addresses; (ii) Drasc had been given an opportunity to provide an email address to Navistar for notice and had chosen not to do so; (iii) Drasc’s lawyers in the Ohio suit had actual notice of the settlement; and (iv) Drasc’s lawyers must have or should have known about the need to opt-out; and (v) because Drasc had actual knowledge of the need to opt-out, it could not show excusable neglect that would justify an extension of the opt-out deadline Id. at 1050-51. The District Court thereby found that Drasc was bound by the release in the settlement and thus the effort litigate separately in Ohio was barred. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed that when the District Court provided a detailed opt-out procedure, and class members declined to follow the procedure, it need not evaluate the “reasonable indication” of the class member. For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling. Kay Co., et al. v. Equitable Prod. Co ., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79739 (S.D. W.Va. April 22, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of property owners, filed a class action alleging that Defendant failed to pay all royalties due in exchange for use of their land for purposes of mining minerals in violation of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and