18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition 57 stripped away from Defendant’s allegations, there was nothing sanctionable about the EEOC’s actions. Id. at 7. For these reasons, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for sanctions. EEOC v. K & L Auto Crushers, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20248, (E.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2021). The EEOC brought an enforcement action against Defendant on behalf of the charging party, Claudia Vestal, alleging violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The EEOC asserted that Defendant discriminated against Vestal by failing or refusing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation, and terminating her because of her disability (cancer) in violation 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Specifically, the complaint alleged that Vestal sought modifications of a work schedule for the time she was undergoing chemotherapy, which Defendant either denied or to which it never responded. The EEOC sought: (i) a permanent injunction to enjoin Defendant from basing any employment decision on an employee’s disability; and (ii) back pay, compensation for past and future pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, and punitive damages for Defendant’ malicious and reckless conduct. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Defendant argued that Plaintiff had not sufficiently made a prima facie case of discrimination. Defendant contended that: (i) Vestal did not request any specific reasonable accommodation for her disability and that her complaint failed to allege that she requested accommodations; (ii) Vestal had not alleged that she provided a specific date for her anticipated return to work; (iii) indefinite leave was not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA; and (iv) the EEOC did not sufficiently allege that Vestal was a qualified individual under the ADA. The Court denied Defendant’s motion. It noted that the bulk of the motion disputed facts and evidentiary issues that were more properly considered at the summary judgment stage. The Court opined that all that was required was that the EEOC plead enough facts to state a claim that was plausible on its face. The Court agreed with the EEOC’s position that Defendant misrepresented the contents of the complaint, most notably on the issues of whether Vestal requested an accommodation. Finally, the Court rejected Defendant’s argument that the complaint should be dismissed because it failed to make a showing of each prong of the prima facie test for discrimination. The Court agreed with the EEOC that Defendant’s argument failed to account for the Supreme Court’s holding in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A. , 534 U.S. 506 (2002). Under Swierkiewicz and its progeny, the EEOC’s complaint should not be dismissed if it does not allege facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. To survive a motion to dismiss, the pleadings need only give Defendant fair notice of the basis of the discrimination claim. As such, the Court concluded that the EEOC had met its burden to state a claim that Vestal was qualified individual under the ADA. The Court determined that Vestal’s assertion that she requested a modified schedule with the ability to appear in person and then requested the ability to work from home implied that Vestal believed that she could perform the essential functions of her job or that she could do so with an accommodation. In sum, the Court ruled that the EEOC’s allegations were enough to provide Defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rested. Likewise, as to the failure to accommodate claim, given the similarity of the elements in both claims, the Court also found that the EEOC had pled enough facts to sufficiently allege a failure to accommodate claim. For these reasons, the Court denied Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Texas, L.P., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214357 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2021). The EEOC filed an action on behalf of the charging party, Jesse Landry ("Landry"), alleging discriminatory failure to hire on the basis of her disability (congenital amputee missing right forearm and hand) in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Following discovery, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Court denied. The EEOC alleged that Landry interviewed for myriad of open positions, during which the interviewer stated that she would be unable to perform the required job duties, including moving and loading boxes, due to her disability. Defendant argued that summary judgment was warranted because the EEOC has failed to establish disability discrimination by direct or circumstantial evidence; because the legitimate, non- discriminatory reason Landry was not hired was not pretextual and Landry’s alleged disability was not a motivating factor in Defendant’s failure to hire her; and because there was no evidentiary basis to support an award of punitive damages. Id . at *7. The EEOC contended that it raised genuine issues of material fact by both direct and circumstantial evidence, which precluded granting Defendant’s motion, that Defendant’s shifting positions regarding its treatment of Landry raised credibility issues, and that the actions and inactions of managers supported an award of punitive damages. Id . The Court concluded that the EEOC cited evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that it had established a prima facie case of disability discrimination for violation of the ADA because Landry suffered an adverse employment action of not being hired on account of a disability. The Court found that Defendant met its burden to state a legitimate, non-