18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

60 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition remanded the District Court’s order. Defendant argued that it was unaware that Kean was disabled and that she was fired for providing a falsified document certifying that she could return to work after initially seeking medical leave. Id . at 963. The District Court had ruled that no reasonable jury could find that Kean met any of the statutory definitions of "disability" under the ADA. Id . Kean was employed as a laundry assistant at Defendant’s facility and suffered from anxiety disorder that manifested in periodic "flare-ups" when she experienced panic attacks. Id . Kean’s flare-ups caused a variety of symptoms, including a racing heart, breathlessness, breaking down and crying, and psoriasis, a skin disorder. Kean thereafter alleged that her co-workers were subjecting her to mistreatment, which caused her anxiety to increase. Kean submitted a note from her doctor to Defendant, requesting that Kean be permitted to miss work due to her condition for one-to-three days per month, and three or four times a year. The next day, Kean asked Defendant’s payroll director about taking FMLA leave, in accordance with the documentation that her doctor had provided. The payroll director informed Kean that she did not qualify for FMLA because she had not been employed at West Meade for 12 full months. While the parties disputed what next occurred, Kean was ultimately terminated from her employment when she failed to produce documentation from her doctor that she was able to return to work. Defendant further asserted that Kean produced falsified doctor’s documents and that was the reason she was terminated. The District Court had concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Kean had a disability as defined by the ADA. On appeal, the EEOC argued that Defendant "regarded Kean as having . . . an impairment," and thereby falling under the ADA’s definition of "disability." Id . at 966. Defendant asserted that Kean’s anxiety did not affect her ability to do her work. The Sixth Circuit noted that even if Defendant were able to show Kean had no other limitations in other activities, these facts did not necessarily rebut the notion that it could have "perceived" her "as having an impairment" and fired her because of that perceived limitation, particularly in light of the updated standard under the ADA. Id . at 968. The Sixth Circuit determined that viewed in the light most favorable to the EEOC, the record indicated that Defendant was not only aware that Kean had an impairment that intermittently affected her ability to perform her job, but also that it was related to stress. Id . at 969. The EEOC further argued that a jury could find that Defendant fired Kean because it regarded her as having an impairment and that Defendant’s "falsification-of-documentation rationale" was entirely pretextual. Id . The Sixth Circuit reasoned that there too many factual disputes for the case to be resolved on the basis of summary judgment. For these reasons, the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the District Court’s ruling granting summary judgment to Defendant. (vii) Seventh Circuit EEOC v. Charter Communications LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 241026 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 17, 2021). The EEOC brought an action on behalf of the charging party, James Kimmons, a call center representative, alleging that Defendant failed to provide him with a reasonable accommodation in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Court denied the EEOC’s motion and granted Defendant’s motion. Kimmons worked as a retention representative scheduled for nine-hour shifts each workday, and lived approximately one hour from the call center location. Kimmons alleged that he suffered from cataracts, which made driving at night difficult because they caused outside light to glare and obstruct his vision. Id . at *3. Accordingly, Kimmons submitted a request for an accommodation for a shift that would allow him to avoid driving to or from work in the dark. In response, Defendant approved Kimmons for a temporary, 30-day shift change, allowing him to work the 10:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., rather than his previously scheduled noon to 9 p.m. shift. Kimmons requested a 30-day extension on his temporary shift change, which Defendant denied. The EEOC asserted that Defendant’s denial of the shift change was discriminatory on the basis of Kimmons’ disability. Defendant argued that it was not required to accommodate Kimmons when he could perform all the essential functions of his job, and even if it was required to accommodate him, Kimmons' accommodation requests were unreasonable because they would have been ineffective. Id . at *5. The EEOC asserted that Defendant unreasonably denied Kimmons an accommodation to which he was entitled under the ADA, and Defendant failed to adduce sufficient facts to support an undue hardship defense. Id . at *6. For purposes of the motion, the Court assumed that Kimmons' alleged night blindness could constitute a disability under the ADA. Id . at *7. The EEOC contended that the ADA imposes a duty on employers to grant reasonable and non-burdensome accommodations permitting an employee to arrive at work, even where the proposed accommodation did not relate to an essential function of the employee's job. Defendant claimed that the ADA did not require an employer to accommodate a disability unrelated to the employee's ability to perform his job's essential functions. Id . at *9. The Court explained that the Seventh Circuit had resolved this same dispute previously, finding that an employer's accommodation duty was “triggered only