18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

604 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition Seventh Circuit opined that truckers who want to avoid the tolls could use the many free roads in Indiana. The Seventh Circuit also ruled that the tolls were neutral with respect to the origin and destination of the trucks, and with their ownership. For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling. State Of California, et al. v. Burrows , Case No. 20-CV-7664 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2021). Plaintiffs, the states of California, Illinois Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, and New Jersey, asserted that a current Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) diversity data-sharing policy was illegal. Defendant, the chair of the EEOC, filed a motion to stay the action in order to review the policy at issue in the case. The Court granted the motion to stay for a 45-day period. Plaintiffs contended that the policy governing how workplace diversity data was shared with state employment agencies limited their access to the information. In order to mitigate any prejudice to Plaintiffs caused by this delay, Defendants agreed to produce a partial certified administrative record 15 days after the end of the 45-day stay period. Accordingly, the Court granted the motion to stay. U.S. Pastor Council, et al. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Case No. 18-CV-824 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of Christian churches and Christian-owned businesses, filed a lawsuit against Defendants, the EEOC and the U.S. Attorney General, seeking a declaratory judgment that Plaintiffs were exempt from the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII for employment actions based on an employee’s LGBTQ status. Specifically, Plaintiffs sought to challenge the applicability of Title VII to religious institutions following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County , 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), which held that Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation. According to Plaintiffs, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the free exercise clause and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution all contradicted the Supreme Court’s holding in Bostock . Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which the Court granted in part and denied in part. In their motion, Defendants primarily contended that: (i) the claims against the EEOC should be dismissed because they are not sufficiently ripe; and (ii) the claims against the Attorney General warranted dismissal because no Plaintiff had standing to sue the Attorney General. Id. at 13. With regard to the ripeness argument, Plaintiffs countered that their claims presented pure questions of law and that they would suffer significant hardship absent declaratory judgment. The Court agreed with Plaintiffs, noting that “Defendants’ concession that Plaintiffs will suffer hardship only if they lose on . . . the merits of this case is precisely why the claims for declaratory judgment are proper here.” Id. at 15. To that end, the Court reasoned that the harm of being forced to alter one’s conduct to avoid future penalties constituted sufficient legal harm. The Court also referenced a plethora of jurisdictional case law authorities maintaining that “a claim is ‘fit for judicial decision’ if it presents a pure question of law.” Id. at 16. In terms of Plaintiffs’ claims against the Attorney General, however, Defendants pointed out that the Attorney General does not enforce Title VII against private employers and has no direct involvement in this action. Consequently, the Court held that Plaintiffs’ alleged injury resulting from the Attorney General was too speculative to warrant Article III standing. Therefore, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the claims against the Attorney General and it denied the motion as to the claims against the EEOC. United States, et al. v. FCA US LLC , 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133740 (E.D. Mich. July 19, 2021) . The United States government filed a criminal enforcement action against Defendant Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (“FCA”) pursuant to a single count indictment charging a conspiracy to violate the Labor-Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). The government alleged that FCA paid money and things of value to United Auto Workers Union (“UAW”) officers and employees "with the intent to benefit persons whom they knew were not permitted to receive the money and things of value." Id . at *14. Defendant pled guilty to the criminal charge. Thereafter, a group of Plaintiffs filed a motion for recognition of crime victim status and for restitution to 234 Plaintiffs in pending and completed civil cases against Defendant, relying on the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”) and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”). The Court concluded that Plaintiffs were not directly and proximately harmed by the specific offense of conviction. The Court opined that Plaintiffs were not crime victims entitled to restitution. The Court noted that in making it determination, it looked to: (i) the offense of conviction based solely on the facts admitted by Defendant; and then (ii) determined, based on those facts, whether any persons were "directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of that Federal offense." Id . at *16. The Court found that restitution should not be imposed because determining complex issues of fact related to the cause or amount of the victim’s losses would complicate or prolong the sentencing process to a degree that its use to provide restitution to any victim was outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process. Id . Further,