18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

62 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition the EEOC’s claims or Defendant’s defenses. The EEOC contended that the financial information sought was within Defendant’s possession and control, relevant to the EEOC’s claim for punitive damages, and proportional to the needs of the case. Id . at *6-7. The Court determined that although Defendant attempted to argue that the information sought was not in its possession or control, the corporate structure entities in question had such a close relationship that they were almost indistinguishable and were sufficiently related. Accordingly, the Court was satisfied that the discovery sought was within Defendant’s possession and control. The Court further agreed with the EEOC that the information sought was "relevant to punitive damages because those records will show the wealth of the CarDon enterprise, which is one measure the jury can use to determine the amount of punitive damages appropriate to punish Defendant for violating the ADA and to deter future violations." Id . at *12. Defendant contended that the scope of the interrogatory was not proportional because Defendant had “already admitted . . . that it has the ability to pay a judgment up to $500,000" and punitive damages will be capped at $300,000. Id . at *14. The Court opined that the Seventh Circuit had expressly rejected this argument in other cases. The Court explained that Defendant’s admission that it would be able to pay a judgment up to $500,000 did not provide any measure to the jury as to how much an appropriate punishment would be should the jury find an award of punitive damages appropriate. Id . at *15. Accordingly, the Court granted the EEOC’s motion to compel. The Court also awarded the EEOC attorneys’ fees in connection with bringing the motion to compel as the prevailing party. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. , 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31099 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 19, 2021). The EEOC filed an action on behalf of a group of current and former female employees alleging that Defendant failed to accommodate the claimants’ pregnancy-related medical restrictions in violation of Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”). Specifically, most of Defendant’s employees were required to be able to lift between 40 and 60 pounds, but Defendant also maintained a temporary alternative duty (“TAD”) program under which associates who had suffered occupational injuries could apply for temporary alternative duty or light duty. According to the EEOC, Defendant violated Title VII and the PDA by forcing pregnant employees to take unpaid leave if they could not perform their job duties, rather than allowing them to receive light duty under the TAD program. Defendant asserted that it did not discriminate against its pregnant employees because, during the relevant time period, the TAD program was a national policy applying only to associates who suffered work- related injuries. Id. at *2. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the Court granted Defendant’s motion while denying the EEOC’s motion. As a threshold matter, the Court reasoned that the EEOC established a prima facie case of discrimination by alleging that the claimants were members of a protected class who sought – and were subsequently denied – an accommodation. Defendant contended that the EEOC failed to show that Defendant accommodated other non-pregnant employees with a similar inability to work, but the Court found that employees who suffered occupational injuries and applied to the TAD program were sufficiently similar for purposes of establishing a prima facie claim under the PDA. In response to the Court’s finding, Defendant argued that the TAD program was a facially neutral policy that consistently applied only to workers injured on the job, thus making the TAD program “pregnancy blind.” Id. at *26. The Court shifted the burden to the EEOC to show that Defendant’s TAD policy imposed a significant burden on pregnant workers as compared to non-pregnant workers. To that end, the EEOC again pointed to the fact that no pregnant employees with medical restrictions were eligible for TAD. However, the Court held that the EEOC’s argument said little about non-pregnant employees when its burden at this stage specifically required it to offer evidence about how Defendant treated non-pregnant employees with medical restrictions who were not injured at work. Id. at *31. The Court further found that the record clearly established that Defendant treated pregnant employees seeking an accommodation exactly like other employees with medical restrictions not stemming from a work-related injury. The EEOC also offered testimony by the claimants regarding allegedly harassing statements made by management about breastfeeding in general, but the Court noted that these statements were made by individuals who had no authority with respect to the TAD program or the claimants’ requests for accommodations. Id. at *42. Therefore, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. , 992 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2021). The EEOC filed an action on behalf of the charging party, Edward Hedican, a Seventh Day Adventist, who worked as an assistant manager, alleging that Defendant failed to provide him with the reasonable accommodation of not working on the Sabbath for his religious beliefs in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Hedican contended that in accordance with his religious beliefs, he could not work between sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday each week. Defendant