18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

626 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition requirement." Id . at *5. Thereafter, in 1991, the Clerk consented to a separate consent decree that required that officials post "prior public notice of the opportunity to apply for and be hired for" all positions beyond a few specified exempt roles. Id. In 1992 the Independent Voters of Illinois-Independent Precinct Organization (“Voters Organization”) joined the first amended complaint, and some Defendants were dismissed from the complaint for complying with the consent decrees. In 2010, a new Magistrate Judge was assigned to the matter, and the Governor of Illinois, as one of the parties to the decrees, objected to the reassignment of a new Magistrate Judge. In 2019, Plaintiff Shakman, the Voters Organization, and the other Plaintiffs moved for supplemental relief, and for appointment of a special master to monitor the Clerk’s compliance with the consent decrees. Id . at *6. Plaintiffs asserted that the Clerk’s hiring practices violated provisions of the 1991 decree. After an evidentiary hearing in March 2020, the Magistrate Judge found that the Clerk had violated the 1991 decree. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that the Magistrate Judge’s decision to leave the consent decrees in place was not an abuse in discretion because the parties had standing, the decrees guarded the freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, and ongoing enforcement of the consent decrees did not present non-justiciable political questions. Id . at *19. Further, the Seventh Circuit opined that the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that the Clerk’s ongoing violations reflected the precise political patronage the consent decrees had sought to end. The Seventh Circuit concluded that each of the Magistrate Judge’s determinations was based on evidence and supported the findings as to how the Clerk has failed to comply with the consent decrees. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s ruling. Shakman, et al. v. Clerk Of Cook County , 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213530 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2021). In this class action, the District Court entered a series consent decrees (the “ Shakman decree”) in 1972 that enjoined the City of Chicago and Cook County officials from engaging in politically-biased employment practices. In 1983, the Shakman decree was amended to add prohibitions for hiring decisions being made or conditioned on any political considerations or affiliations. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling that the First Amendment’s prohibition against patronage-based firings recognized in Elrod v. Burns , 427 U.S. 347 (1976), extended to promotion, transfer, recall, or hiring decisions involving public employment positions for which party affiliation was not an appropriate requirement, the Clerk consented to a separate consent decree that required that officials post prior public notice of the opportunity to apply for and be hired for all positions beyond a few specified exempt roles. In 2019, Plaintiffs moved for supplemental relief, and for appointment of a Compliance Administrator to monitor the Clerk’s compliance with the consent decrees. Plaintiffs asserted that the Clerk’s hiring practices violated provisions of the 1991 consent decree. After an evidentiary hearing in March 2020, the Magistrate Judge found that the Clerk had violated the 1991 consent decree and ordered that a Compliance Administrator be appointed to monitor compliance. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that the Magistrate Judge’s decision to leave the consent decrees in place was not an abuse in discretion because the parties had standing, the consent decrees guarded the freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, and ongoing enforcement of the consent decrees did not present non-justiciable political questions. Following these findings and a remand, Plaintiffs filed a bill of costs, and a motion for attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party. Plaintiffs sought to recover a total of $593,507.60 in fees and $11,733.39 in costs. Id . at *8. The Clerk objected to: (i) Plaintiffs’ status as "prevailing parties" under Rule 54(d)(1); and (ii) the reasonableness of their requested fee awards. Id . In analyzing whether Plaintiffs were the prevailing party, the District Court determined that Plaintiffs requested and were granted their primary request of the appointment of a Compliance Administrator to guard against further consent decree violations. Therefore, the District Court concluded that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party due to their success in securing the appointment. In addition, the District Court explained that the Clerk’s objections to Plaintiffs’ fee and cost award was not timely filed, and even if it had been filed timely, it raised no sufficiently specific objections to the hours worked and to the rates provided. The District Court also opined that the requested rates and hours worked were reasonable in light of the result obtained by Plaintiffs’ counsel on behalf of the class. For these reasons, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. Editor ’ s Note : The Shakman litigation is one of the longest running lawsuits in the United States. Filed in 1969, the case is now 52 years old.