18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

628 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition the subpoena was beyond the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(2), and was not material, relevant, or necessary to prove Plaintiffs’ claims in the case. The Enquirer further asserted that the subpoena should be quashed based upon the two prior adverse discovery rulings concerning the same or similar information. The Court denied the motion on the grounds that the subpoena sought irrelevant material and would unduly burden The Enquirer, which was not a party to the litigation. In so ruling, the Court pointed to the persuasive reasoning of the two prior adverse rulings while noting that Plaintiffs had ample opportunity to obtain the requested documents and much more relevant and probative discovery directly from Defendant Chiquita in the case. The Court opined that the best source of evidence to prove any involvement of Chiquita in Ecuador during the relevant timeframe was Chiquita officials and employees alleged to have been involved at that time and not The Enquirer. In sum, the Court granted The Enquirer’s motion to quash because the burden placed on it to produce the documents vastly outweighed any hypothetical benefit to Plaintiffs. (liv) Multi-Party Litigation Over Modification Of Employee/Retirement Benefits Harris, et al. v. County Of Orange , 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 32303 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2021) . Plaintiffs, a group of retired public employees, filed a class action alleging that Defendant breached its contractual obligations to retired employees and deprived them of vested health benefits by restructuring the method by which it assisted retired employees in defraying the cost of their health insurance. The District Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling. In 1993, Defendant and the Orange County Employee Retirement System (“OCERS”) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) which allowed Defendant to access surplus investment earnings controlled by the OCERS to deposit a portion of the surplus into an Additional Retirement Benefit Account (“ARBA”) to pay for health insurance of present and future retirees. Id . at *3. In April 1993, the County adopted the Retiree Medical Plan, funded by investment earnings from the ARBA account and mandatory employee deductions. The Retiree Medical Plan explicitly provided that the Plan did not create any vested rights to benefits. Id . From 1993 through 2007, retired employees received a monthly grant (“the Grant Benefit”) to defray the cost of healthcare premiums. Id . Beginning in 2004, Defendant negotiated with its labor unions to restructure the retiree medical program, which was by then underfunded. Id . Ultimately, Defendant approved an agreement with the labor unions that reduced benefits for retirees. Plaintiffs argued that the MOUs demonstrated an intent by Defendant to create an implied vested right to the Grant Benefit, and that the County breached the MOUs by reducing the Grant Benefit. The Ninth Circuit held that Plaintiffs’ claim to an implied vested right to the Grant Benefit was foreclosed because the prescribed law of Orange County set forth in the Retiree Medical Plan was at variance with such a right. Id . The Ninth Circuit determined that Plaintiffs failed to raise a material issue of fact regarding Defendant’s intent to create an implied vested right to the grant. Further, Defendant provided evidence that the Retiree Medical Plan was adopted by resolution and therefore became governing law with respect to Grant Benefits and thus became part of the MOUs. Id . at *3. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that absent express language providing that the Grant Benefits vested, the right to the benefits expired when the MOUs expired. Id . For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Klass, et al. v. Allstate Insurance Co., Case No. 20-14104 (11th Cir. Dec. 28, 2021). Plaintiffs, groups of retirees in a two consolidated actions, alleged that Defendant ceased paying life insurance premiums due to them under an ERISA-governed insurance plan. Following discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment, which the District Court granted on the basis that Defendant unambiguously reserved the right to terminate the coverage under the summary plan descriptions. The District Court further determined that Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling. The first class action involved employees who retired after 1990, and the second class action involved Plaintiffs who retired pursuant to a special retirement opportunity offered in the 1990s. Defendant thereafter terminated the life insurance premiums as of January 1, 2016. Plaintiffs contended that Defendant violated the terms of the plans by terminating the benefits. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. It found that the plan documents for both groups unambiguously reserved to Defendant the right to amend, modify, or end the benefits beginning in 1990. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that beginning in 1990, Defendant’s retirement plan language was subject to its own decision to maintain the life-time retirement benefits. The Eleventh Circuit further reasoned that pursuant to U.S. Supreme Court precedent, ERISA plans should be construed under the plain language of the documents, and that Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendant made them oral promises of continued coverage should not override the