18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition 653 the burden to show that the CBA provided for a rate of pay no less than 30% above minimum wage. The Court held that Defendant failed to carry its burden because the CBA clearly stated that banquet servers earned minimum wages, and Defendant’s only evidence to the contrary was a conclusory declaration by its director of human resources. Regarding the second step in this inquiry, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs’ claims required interpreting whether the phrase “hourly rate” (as contained in the CBA) was intended to included service fees. Id . at *21. However, the Court reasoned that Defendant did not “provide its position on the term’s meaning” and, thus, failed to “show how there is active dispute over the meaning of ‘hourly rate.’” Id. at *22. Therefore, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Matthews, et al. v. Centrus Energy, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 30025 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 2021). Plaintiffs filed a state court class action alleging that Defendant subjected them to exposure to radioactive material released by a Defendants’ nuclear plant. Defendants removed the action and then moved to dismiss, arguing that the Price- Anderson Act (“the Act”), which governs "any public liability action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident," preempted Plaintiffs’ claims. Id . at *3. The District Court agreed and granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling. In creating the Act, Congress created a system of private insurance, government indemnification, and limited liability for federal licensees in order "to protect the public" while still encouraging “the development of the atomic energy industry." Id . at *4. Even absent complete preemption, the Price-Anderson Act allows for removal and preempts state law claims. The Act expressly permits removal of public liability actions, or any lawsuit asserting liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. § 2210(n)(2). The Act also deems any public liability action to be a federal action, even if it is brought under state law in state court. Id . at *11. Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants misleadingly portrayed the plant as safe when, in reality, it discharged radioactive material that caused them to suffer harm. Id . at *5-6. Plaintiffs alleged that their exposure to that radioactive material caused them bodily injuries and property losses. The District Court had ruled that Plaintiffs’ state law claims fit “squarely within" the Price-Anderson Act’s definition of "nuclear incident," meaning the claims were preempted. Id . On appeal, Plaintiffs challenged the District Court’s holding that the Act preempted their state law claims and that Plaintiffs otherwise failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The Sixth Circuit explained that for claims arising from a nuclear incident, a Plaintiff "can sue under the Price-Anderson Act, as amended, or not at all." Id . at *12. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that although Plaintiffs alleged they suffered from a “nuclear occurrence,” they did not assert a “nuclear incident” and thus the claims constituted a "public liability action." Id . at *12-13. The Sixth Circuit thereby held that the Act completely preempted Plaintiffs’ claim. Finally, since Plaintiffs asserted that their "claims do not fall within the scope of the Price-Anderson Act," the Sixth Circuit ruled that the District Court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a cognizable claim. (lix) Preemptive Motions To Strike Or Dismiss Class Allegations Borgese, et al. v. Baby Brezza Enterprises LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30216 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2021). Plaintiff filed a consumer fraud class action alleging that failures in the design, sale, and marketing of Defendants’ Baby Brezza Formula Pro and Formula Pro Advanced machines. Defendants filed a motion to strike the class allegations, which the Court granted. Defendants sold automatic baby formula mixing machines. Plaintiff alleged that the machines did not perform as marketed and as a result of consuming formula mixed by the machines, his child and other similarly-situated children received poor nutrition and suffered from associated complications and injuries. Plaintiff argued that Defendants’ acts were intentional and aimed at securing their own economic gain, resulting in damages, including the costs of the machine and medical and other expenses in violation of several state laws. Defendants contended that Plaintiff’s proposed class failed to meet the predominance requirement and thereby requested that the Court strike the class allegations. The Court found that Plaintiff’s complaint did not list where other purchasers of the Baby Brezza machines resided, where they purchased the machines, or where they suffered any resulting injury. The Court concluded that it was unable to determine which state laws applied and if those laws materially differed. The Court noted that to determine whether the class allegations had been plausibly alleged, the Court would have to assume that the majority of the claims were brought under state laws that had no material differences, without any indication as to which state laws might be implicated, and thus there was no basis to conclude that those state laws were similar. Id . at *11. The Court noted that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege any common legal issued that predominated over individualized issues. The Court also found that Plaintiff’s proposed class of all buyers of Baby Brezza machines included no information regarding similarities among class members, and thus failed to establish that the class