18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition 655 Chalmers, et al. v. City Of New York, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176527 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of fire protection inspectors (“FPIs”) with the Fire Department of the City of New York (“FDNY”), filed a class action alleging that Defendant subjected them to discrimination on the basis of their race (Caucasian) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. FPIs were employed by the FDNY to conduct inspections of buildings, facilities, vehicles, and public activities in New York City to ensure compliance with safety codes and regulations. Id . at *2. Thirty percent of FPIs were White. Plaintiffs argued that FPIs salaries that were substantially lower than salaries paid to the City’s building inspectors ("BIs") where Caucasian employees comprised 50% of the workforce, even though they had the same principal duties of conducting field inspections. Plaintiffs alleged that FPIs’ lower base salaries resulted in lower overtime pay and pension benefits, and amounted to disparate treatment of FPIs as a predominantly-minority workforce, compared to similarly-situated BIs. Id . at *5. Plaintiffs also contended that Defendant maintained a policy of paying FPIs at, or slightly above, the minimum salary level established in their union’s collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), while paying BIs well above the minimum salary prescribed by their union’s CBA. Id . at *5-6. Defendant argued that Plaintiffs were not similarly-situated in all materials respects to BIs, and therefore they failed to allege sufficient comparators who were treated more favorably. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court found Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that FPIs and BIs "work together and in tandem to perform the same function," and thus plausibly alleged these groups are similarly-situated. Id . at *12. Plaintiffs also asserted that Defendant’s facially neutral practice of paying FPIs the minimum allowed under their CBA, while paying BIs "much more than the minimum" range, resulted in a disparate impact under Title VII and the NYCHRL because the predominantly-minority FPIs received lower compensation than predominantly-white BIs. Id . at *13. The Court opined that with the allegations in the complaint showing the salary analysis over the past decade, Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that Defendant’s practice of paying predominantly-minority FPIs the minimum salary prescribed by their CBA, while paying predominantly- white BIs significantly more than the minimum salary established in their CBA, "disproportionately and adversely" affected minority FPIs in terms of their compensation. Id . at *15. In addition, Defendant contended that white FPIs could not state a claim for disparate treatment under Title VII and the NYCHRL because they could not allege they were discriminated against on the basis of their race. The Court agreed. It explained that to state a claim under Title VII, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege facts that indicated that the white FPIs faced adverse action, and that their race was a "motivating factor" in such action. Id . at *16. The Court ruled that Plaintiffs have failed to make the required allegations, because they plead no allegations that specifically relate to white FPIs. Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant’s motion as to Plaintiffs’ Title VII discrimination claims. The Court also granted the motion as to Plaintiffs’ NYCHRL discrimination claim on the basis that Plaintiffs failed to plead facts that went to the "independent injuries" white FPIs had suffered, or the relationship between them and their minority counterparts. Id . at *20. Accordingly, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss the discrimination claims. Christensen, et al. v. Boeing Co. , 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4745 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of flight attendants, filed a class action alleging that Defendant subjected them to lost wages and other damages that they suffered as a result of the grounding in 2019 of Defendant’s 737 Max aircraft. Plaintiffs brought claims of fraud, which alleged that Defendant made material misrepresentations to customers and the public to circumvent the appropriate regulatory process and rush the aircraft into production and service. Id . at *3. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The Court granted Defendant’s motion. Defendant contended that Plaintiffs failed to allege proximate causation. The Court noted that in the context of fraud, cause-in-fact was "but for" cause, meaning the relevant inquiry would be whether the alleged harm would have occurred absent Defendant’s conduct. Id . at *4. The Court determined that Plaintiffs failed to allege how Defendant’s alleged misrepresentations injured the named Plaintiffs, as the complaint contained no allegations that Plaintiffs were schedule to work on the cancelled flights and thus lost income, nor did it connect any alleged injury to Defendant’s alleged misrepresentations. Id . at *5. The Court reasoned that Plaintiffs’ allegations concerned alleged misrepresentations made during negotiations of a collective bargaining agreement between Plaintiffs and Southwest Airlines, which occurred well before Defendant began testing the 737 Max aircraft. Further, the Court held that Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege legal causation, as their alleged injuries were far too remote from Defendant’s alleged misconduct. The Court determined that Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were not a direct result of Defendant’s alleged misconduct, but an indirect result of Defendant’s