18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

732 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition ‘the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,’ not whether the class is so numerous that failing to certify presents the risk of many separate lawsuits." Id . The Fourth Circuit therefore found that the District Court’s analysis was contrary to the text of Rule 23. The Fourth Circuit ruled that District Court incorrectly analyzed the judicial economy factor, and on remand it should consider whether judicial economy favored either a class action or joinder. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the judicial-economy factor would always favor class certification, which would be simpler to manage than individual lawsuits. Id . In analyzing the class members’ ability and motivation to litigate, the District Court had focused its analysis on the economics of individual suits and held that "evidence from other cases regarding class members’ motivation to pursue claims on their own" favored class treatment. Id . at 235-36. However, the Fourth Circuit found that there was no showing that it would be uneconomical for smaller claimants to be individually joined as parties in a traditional lawsuit. Id . at 236. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the District Court’s numerosity analysis improperly looked to the impracticability of individual suits rather than joinder. For these reasons, the Fourth Circuit therefore reversed and remanded the District Court’s ruling granting Plaintiffs’’ motion for class certification. (lxxviii) The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine In Class Actions Efreom, et al. v. McKee, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72813 (D.R.I. April 5, 2021). Plaintiffs, a group of members of the Employees’ Retirement System of the State of Rhode Island, filed a class action alleging that reductions in their pension benefits were unconstitutional. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The doctrine stems from the rulings in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and provides that federal courts (other than the U.S. Supreme Court) cannot review state court decisions unless provided for by Congress. Previously, the Rhode Island General Assembly passed the Rhode Island Retirement Security Act ("RIRSA"), which reorganized these calculations for pension benefits. Much litigation followed, and the parties ultimately entered into a settlement agreement in state court in 2015. Plaintiffs in this case were class members in the previous litigation. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs’ claims were based on the same set of facts that were the subject of the previous actions and were barred by res judicata . Further, Defendants argued that all counts were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they were an impermissible collateral attack on a final state court judgment. The Court agreed with Defendants’ argument. It found that even if Plaintiffs’ claims were not subject to res judicata , the Court would lack jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars federal courts from entertaining "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments” rendered before the federal court proceedings commenced and inviting review and rejection of those judgments. Id . at *29. The Court held that were it to review the law through Plaintiffs’ claims, it would be reviewing the decisions of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which was precisely what the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibited. For these reasons, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (lxxix) Trafficking Victims Protection Act In Class Action Litigation Bersoum, et al. v. Mustafa, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205660 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2021). Plaintiffs, 128 Egyptian citizens, filed a class action seeking compensatory and punitive damages against Defendants, five Libyan officials, alleging that they were responsible for the torture, extrajudicial detention, and unlawful deportation of Plaintiffs in and from Libya in violation of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 ("TVPA") and the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATS"). Plaintiffs contended that personal jurisdiction existed over Defendant Ibrahim Omar Dabbashi ("Dabbashi") because Dabbashi lives in New York and because his tortious acts and omissions were committed in New York. Id . at *4-5. Defendants had not appeared in the action. The Court explained that the TVPA permits a Plaintiff "to pursue their claims of official torture” under the jurisdiction conferred by the ATA “and also under the general federal question jurisdiction…” because “customary international law imposes individual liability for a limited number of international crimes – including war crimes, crimes against humanity (such as genocide), and torture” and that the Second Circuit has held that the ATS “provides jurisdiction over claims in tort against individuals who are alleged to have committed such crimes." Id. at *21. Further, the Court noted that the Second Circuit had found that the TVPA is not subject to the territorial constraints on common law causes of action. Id. at *21-22. Therefore, the Court concluded that because Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants committed torture, the ATS allowed the Court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims under the TVPA. Id . at *22. However, the Court still found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims, as none