18th Annual Workplace Class Action Report - 2022 Edition

740 Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: 2022 Edition contracting with Westinghouse Electric Co. (“WEC”) to build two nuclear reactors. WEC then sub-contracted with Defendant Fluor Corp. (“Fluor”) to employ workers to build the nuclear reactors and handle onsite management of the project. Id. at *5. In July 2017, SCANA – without providing prior notice to Fluor – terminated the project, thus resulting in the layoff of approximately 5,000 workers. Defendants SCANA and Fluor filed motions for summary judgment, and Plaintiffs also filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The Court granted Defendants’ motions and denied Plaintiffs’ cross-motion. With respect to SCANA’s potential liability, Plaintiffs contended that SCANA exerted sufficient control over the project and the independent contractors to warrant the Court treating SCANA, WEC, and Fluor as a single entity for purposes of this litigation. However, after reviewing the U.S. Department of Labor’s regulations on the factors concerning joint employer liability, the Court determined that SCANA could not be held liable under the WARN Act. The Court noted that SCANA and the independent contractors shared no common directors and did not exert common ownership over the management aspects of the project. The Court also rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that SCANA exerted “ de facto control” over the contractors, since it found that “SCANA’s control of Fluor and WEC was largely within the expected bounds of a principal client’s relationship with its hired contractor or subcontractor.” Id. at *22. Thus, the Court granted SCANA’s motion for summary judgment. In terms of Fluor’s motion, the Court noted that the parties agreed that Fluor did not provide notice of termination at least 60-days prior to the date of termination. However, the Court nevertheless determined that Fluor could not be held liable because the project’s abrupt end constituted an unforeseeable business circumstance. To this point, Plaintiffs argued that “Fluor was willfully ignorant of the Project’s rapidly mounting problems.” Id. at *53. The Court reasoned, however, that SCANA intentionally withheld material details regarding the financial health of the project, so the project’s abrupt conclusion was not reasonably foreseeable for Fluor. Furthermore, the Court opined that “Plaintiffs have identified no cases involving [unforeseeable business circumstances] that required or otherwise assigned a duty to an independent contractor to conduct an ongoing investigation into the continuing health and status of a job site.” Id. at *65-66. Accordingly, the Court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and denied Plaintiffs’ cross-motion. ERISA Industry Committee, et al. v. Asaro-Angelo , 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95894 (D.N.J. May 20, 2021). Plaintiff, a Washington, D.C.-based non-profit trade association that advocates and lobbies for its employer members "to preserve ERISA’s national uniformity, which protects employers and employees from disparate state and local regulations of health and retirement plans,” filed a class action against Defendant, the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Labor, stemming from recent amendments to the Millville Dallas Airmotive Plant Job Loss Notification Act ("New Jersey WARN Act"). New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy signed into law S.B. 3170, which amended the New Jersey WARN Act by: (i) decreasing the threshold for a mass layoff from 500 employees to 50 employees; (ii) revising the definition of “establishment” to extend to all facilities within the entire state instead of a single facility; and (iii) requiring covered employers to provide severance pay to all full-time and part-time employees impacted by the statute’s amended definition of qualifying severance events. Id . at *2-3. Plaintiff sought a declaration from the Court that the ERISA expressly preempted the WARN Act amendments, and sought to enjoin enforcement of the amended WARN Act’s requirements. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court denied. Defendant argued that he lacked enforcement authority as Commissioner under the WARN Act and, that only laid off employees could enforce WARN Act violations through private causes of action. Defendant further contended that even assuming that the Commissioner had “general enforcement authority” over violations of the New Jersey WARN Act, Plaintiff had made no allegations that “the Commissioner has either enforced or threatened to enforce the statute." Id . at *8. Plaintiff argued that Defendant did have the authority to enforce the New Jersey WARN Act, as it expressly required Defendant "to establish a ‘response’ team to provide information and counseling on compliance to employers and employees when an event triggers the Act’s requirements." Id . at *9. Plaintiff argued that Defendant was properly named as a Defendant in the action. The Court agreed with Plaintiff, finding that Defendant, by his authority pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:1-6 and his role in the New Jersey WARN Act challenge process, had a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the statute. Defendant also argued that Plaintiff lacked both organizational and associational standing to pursue the action. Plaintiff asserted it "had to divert and expend its resources in order to address the harms posed by S.B. 3170’s amendments and educate its member companies on the implications of the amendments." Id . at *14. The Court determined that Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrated an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing. Further, because Plaintiff alleged injuries that were derived from future enforcement of the New Jersey WARN Act amendments, the Court concluded it